Numbers · Chapter 30

And Moses spoke to the children of Israel according to all that Hashem commanded Moses.

ויאמר משה אל בני ישראל AND MOSES TOLD THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL — This is stated to separate this subject (of sacrifies) from the following (vows). Such is the opinion of R. Ishmael. What it means is: since up to now we have the words of the Omnipresent to Moses (Numbers 28:1—2: “And the Lord said to Moses, ‘Command the children of Israel, etc.’ ”) and the chapter about vows that follows begins with an utterance of Moses (“And Moses spake”), it is necessary first to make a break by stating that Moses in turn told this section to Israel (“And Moses told etc.”), for if this were not done it would imply that he did not tell them this section about the sacrifices, but began his address with the chapter about vows (Sifrei Bamidbar 152).

AND MOSES TOLD THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL [ACCORDING TO ALL THAT THE ETERNAL COMMANDED MOSES]. “‘This is [stated] in order to separate the subject [of the offerings from that of the following chapter, dealing with vows and oaths].’ These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. [The meaning thereof is as follows:] Since up till this point [we have] the words of G-d [to Moses], and the [following] section of vows begins with the statement of Moses, it was necessary to separate the subject [of the offerings] by stating that Moses repeated it and told this section to Israel; for if this were not stated, one might have thought that he did not tell them this [section dealing with the offerings], but began his words with the section of vows.” These are the words of Rashi. But I do not understand them, for [we find] similarly that it says — at the end of the section [dealing with] blemishes [in priests], And Moses spoke unto Aaron, and to his sons, and unto all the children of Israel; and it says at the end of the section of the festivals, And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal [and in both these cases the subsequent chapters also begin with G-d’s utterance to Moses; so why was it necessary, according to Rashi, to separate here the sections by saying that Moses declared those laws to the children of Israel]!But according to its plain meaning, the verse here comes to say that although this section deals with the laws of the offerings, G-d did not single out Aaron and his sons in connection with it, as in the sections of [the book] “the Law of the Priests” [i.e. the Book of Leviticus]. Instead Moses said it to all the children of Israel together, according to all that the Eternal commanded Moses, including the laws of refraining from work on the festivals, and [the laws of] the Daily Whole-offerings, the Additional Offerings, the vow-offerings and the freewill offerings, for thus it was told to Moses, Command the children of Israel. And the reason [for this] is because this commandment applies after they enter the Land, and it is a commandment to all Israel to observe [the laws of] the Daily Whole-offerings and the Additional Offerings [of the Sabbath and festivals] in their appointed times, and to bring their vow-offerings and freewill offerings. Furthermore, the main intention of the commandment [to offer up offerings] is that these days should be remembered and kept, and to refrain on them from all servile work [and therefore it was told to all the children of Israel]. Now this section is like the section of the festivals in “the Law of the Priests” [i.e. the Book of Leviticus]. For it says there at the beginning, Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, and at the end it says, And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal, and here likewise at the beginning [of the section it says], Command the children of Israel, and say unto them and at the end [in the verse befor...

ככל אשר צוה ה׳ את משה in accordance with all that G'd commanded Moses. The Torah did not content itself with writing אותו, "him," but wrote instead את משה, although the word "him" would have been quite unmistakable. The reason is that we deal with an independent statement by the Torah, i.e. a testimony by the Torah that what Moses conveyed to the people was exactly what G'd had commanded him to convey. It was not merely what Moses thought that G'd had commanded him to convey.

ויאמר משה אל בני ישראל, “Moses said to the Children of Israel, etc.” Rashi, basing himself on Rabbi Yishmael in the Sifri, justifies this verse by stating that whereas up until now the Torah had reported the words of G’d to Israel, the legislation introduced about vows could prove confusing as the pronoun endings in the words לבד מנדריכם, “except for your vows, etc.” in verse 29,39 could have been misunderstood in that Moses did not teach the legislation about the offerings on the festivals until each festival was about to occur. By making an interval before the legislation about vows in chapter thirty, it becomes clear that what was written before had already been revealed to the people by Moses. Nachmanides comments that he does not understand what Rashi had in mind. He quotes Leviticus 21,24 where at the conclusion of the chapter dealing with physical blemishes which disqualify a priest from offering sacrifices in the Temple, there is a similar verse to that we find here although one could not possibly justify that verse by the type of the reader’s confusion cited by Rabbi Yishmael in the Sifri, the subject at the beginning of chapter 22 being one that is totally different from that just concluded. Moreover, at the end of Leviticus, when Moses had concluded the legislation about the festivals, [excluding the sacrificial service on those days, Ed.] the Torah also inserts a verse signaling this conclusion when writing וידבר משה את מועדי ה' אל בני ישראל, “Moses informed the Children of Israel of the festivals of Hashem” (Leviticus 23,44). The subject matter commencing with chapter 24 there also does not allow for any confusion with what preceded it, and yet the Torah saw fit to insert an apparently superfluous verse. According to the plain meaning of the text, we have to understand that although in the most recently concluded chapter the role of Aaron and his sons, [the role of the priests, generally, Ed,] had not been spelled out, as opposed to the legislation about the festivals in the requisite chapters in Leviticus, and the words of Moses are reported as addressed “only” to “the Children of Israel,” this must not be misunderstood. Once the Children of Israel would take up residence in the Holy Land, some of them hundreds of kilometers from Jerusalem, they might think that the whole subject of sacrificial service on the festivals is one reserved for the priests. By stressing that Moses addressed the Children of Israel, ignoring the priests as people who are different, the Torah reminded the people at large that all of them had a vital role to play in making these festivals meaningful, the duty for the males to make a pilgrimage being only one part of this. Not only this, Moses did not even repeat the term מועדי ה'', “Hashem’s festivals,” which had been used so prominently in the relevant chapters in Leviticus. All of this was designed to impress the people that the legislation was relevant in the highest degree to the entire nation, to all its members. As to the Sifri, i.e. the Midrash of Rabbi Yishmael quoted by Rashi, the meaning of the word להפסיק, to establish a break in continuity, is that contrary to the principle of establishing conceptual linkages, based on two subjects in the Torah being written one adjoining the other, here we are not to apply the principle of דורשים סמוכים, of trying to make halachic parallels between such subjects. Personally, (Nachmanides speaking) what Rabbi Yishmael had in mind was that if the Torah had concluded the previous section with the line אלה תעשו לה' במועדיכם, (29,39) and had immediately commenced with וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות זה הדבר וגו', “Moses spoke to the heads of the various tribes: this is the thing that Hashem has commanded, etc.,” we would have construed the next chapter as being a continuation of the previous chapter, and would have assumed that the entire legislation about the public offerings to be presented in the Temple on the various festivals had been relayed by Moses to the heads of the tribes, for them in turn to relay it to the individual members of each tribe, instead of our knowing that the entire legislation had been communicated by Moses directly to the whole people.

And Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel, saying: This is the word that Hashem has commanded.

ראשי המטות [AND MOSES SPAKE TO] THE HEADS OF THE TRIBES OF THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL] — This does not mean that he spoke only to the princes of the children of Israel and not to the people also, but that he showed respect to the princes by teaching them first and that afterwards he taught the children of Israel. This explanation seems to assume that this was the general method of instruction, but from what Biblical verse may we infer that this was so in the case of all addresses, and that this was no exceptional case? Because it says, (Exodus 34:31—32) “[And Moses called unto them], and Aaron and all the princes of the congregation returned unto him and Moses spake unto them; and afterwards all the children of Israel came nigh, [and he gave them all the commandments which the Lord had spoken to him in Mount Sinai]”. But if this be no exceptional case, what reason is there for Scripture going out of its way to state it here? Because by specially stating that the laws about vows were taught in the first instance to the princes and afterwards to the Israelites, it intends to teach that the annulling of vows is really to be effected by one person who is expert in the Law, and that only if there be no such expert, may they be annulled by three ordinary persons. But you may perhaps say that the statement does mean that Moses spoke this section only to the princes of the children of Israel, and that Moses did not speak to them also, and that consequently nothing about the expert and laymen can be inferred! But it is stated here, “This is the word”, and it is stated in the passage dealing with “animals slaughtered outside the sanctuary” (Leviticus 17:2) “This is the word”. What is the case there? It was addressed to Aaron and to his sons and to all the children of Israel, as it is said there, “Speak unto Aaron [and unto his sons and unto all the children of Israel]”! So, too, this was addressed to all of them (and the reason why it is stated here is to tell us that the annulling of vows etc., as above) (cf. Sifrei Bamidbar 153:1; Nedarim 78a). זה הדבר THIS IS THE WORD — Moses prophesied with the words (introduced his message by the statement), “Thus saith the Lord, About midnight [will I go into the midst of Egypt]” (Exodus 11:4), and other prophets also prophesied with “Thus saith the Lord”, Moses, however, had an additional superiority in that he prophesied also with the expression “This is the actual word [that God hath spoken]” (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:2). Another explanation of זה הדבר THIS IS THE WORD: it is a restrictive phrase serving to intimate that the Sage (the expert) makes use of the expression “invalidating” (התרה), and the husband (dealing with his wife’s vows), only of the expression “annulling” (הפרה), as is the language of Scripture here (e. g., in v. 9), and that if they (one of them) exchanges the expression, it (the vow) is not invalidated nor is it annulled as the case may be (Nedarim 78a).

AND MOSES SPOKE UNTO THE HEADS OF THE TRIBES. Scripture did not precede this section with [the statement]: “And the Eternal spoke unto Moses, saying: Speak unto the heads of the tribes, and say unto them: This is the thing which the Eternal hath commanded,” as He stated in the section [dealing with] slaughtering [offerings] outside the Sanctuary Court, and in other sections. Instead, He mentioned it as the end of this section, saying, These are the statutes, which the Eternal commanded Moses. And in the section of Vayehi Bayom Ha’shemini it says: And Moses said: ‘This is the thing which the Eternal commanded that ye should do,’ but did not mention the [actual] command [given by G-d to Moses] at all. Similarly, in the section about the manna [it is said], And Moses said: ‘This is the thing which the Eternal hath commanded: Let an omerful of it be kept etc.’ [although the Divine command about it to Moses is not expressly stated].Now the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel are the princes of the standards, whom the tribes had appointed over their standards after Nachshon the son of Amminadab [prince of the children of Judah] and his colleagues had died. It is possible that they [the heads of the tribes referred to here] were those who are mentioned in the section [dealing with] the inheritance [of the Land]: These are the names of the men that shall take possession of the Land for you; or it may be that those [referred to here] were others, for there Scripture speaks about [the leaders of] the future [saying] that when they come to divide up the Land [in the time of Joshua] all those mentioned will be living, and they will represent them [in the apportionment of the Land].And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes. The reason [why he did not address this section to the entire people] is because it was not necessary to teach all the children of Israel that the father and husband [of a woman] can declare void those vows [of their daughter or wife, respectively] which involve affliction of the soul, and perhaps it is [even] necessary to conceal these [rights] from them, so that they should not treat vows lightly. But it was to the Sages of Israel, the heads of their tribes, that he taught the ordinance [of vows]. The verse also alludes to the interpretation of our Rabbis [who said] that the heads of the tribes have a special function and power in vows over and above the rest of the people, namely, that a single person who is an expert in the laws can release a person from a vow [and therefore, this section was addressed to the heads of the tribes, i.e., the Sages].Now the [power of] release from vows [by a Sage] is not expressly stated in the Torah, but it is a law declared to Moses on Sinai, and Scripture “hung it on a hair’s-breadth,” just as the Rabbis have said: “[The rules concerning] the release from vows [by a Sage] hover in the air, and have nothing [in Scripture itself] on which they can be based.” But Scripture did allude to it...

"The heads of the tribes." In my view this passage was given after the war with Midian, and that is why it appears after it — just as [the episode of] "Miriam and Aaron spoke against Moses" comes after "And they were in Hazeroth," as I have explained. For Scripture says that the sons of Gad came to Moses, to Eleazar, and to the princes of the congregation and stated their words; and afterward it is written: "Moses commanded them through Eleazar the priest and Joshua son of Nun and the heads of the fathers of the tribes" — these are the same princes of the congregation mentioned there. And because Moses had said to the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuben, "Whatever goes forth from your mouths you shall do," it then states: "Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes," and there it is written: "All that goes forth from his mouth he shall do." "To the children of Israel" — that they should declare this to the children of Israel.

'וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות....זה הדבר אשר צוה ה, G’d had commanded the basic legislation at Mount Sinai when He had said (Leviticus 19,12) ולא תשבעו בשמי לשקר וחללת וגו' “do not render a false oath in My name and thereby desecrate it.” The plain meaning of that verse had not been that you must not deliberately swear falsely, but that having sworn you must honour your oath in all its details. A woman who is married and therefore subject to restrictions imposed upon her by the authority of her husband, is not considered as having desecrated G’d’s name when violating her vows or oath on that account, provided her husband had declared her vow void.

אל ראשי המטות, to the leaders of the tribes, etc. What is so different about this commandment that Moses assembled the chiefs of the tribes to inform them of it and that they in turn were to tell the Israelites? Sifri claims that seeing in Numbers 10,3 in connection with the trumpets the congregation was mentioned before the leaders, and Moses was afraid that this would be misinterpreted to mean that the congregation at large took precedence over the princes, he made sure in 10,4 that the princes were referred to as the heads of the congregation. Moses did something similar here when he addressed the heads of the tribes first. In Nedarim 78 we are told that the reason the heads of the tribes are mentioned here was to hint that vows may be dissolved by a lone judge if he is an expert in the subject. All these comments are strictly allegorical. We need to understand also why the Torah writes המטות לבני ישראל. All Moses had to say was מטות בני ישראל. What is the reason for the extra letter ל? We must assume that the reason for the extra letter is to avoid a misunderstanding. Had the Torah not written לבני ישראל, we might have thought that the legislation was aimed only at the leaders of the people. By writing the extra letter ל, the Torah ensured that we would understand the legislation as applying to the leaders of the people as well as to the nation at large. The absence of the letter ו in front of לבני ישראל is not significant as the Torah has omitted that letter on frequent occasions where we would have expected it such as in Exodus 1,2 ראובן, שמעון, etc. I have come across a Baraitha in Baba Batra 120 which goes as follows: "I might have thought that Moses said this paragraph only to the princes; to prevent me from thinking this the Torah wrote זה הדבר, 'this is the thing, etc.' We have the same expression in Leviticus 17,2 where the subject is the prohibition to slaughter animals for their meat and eat them unless they had first been offered as sacrifices in the Tabernacle. This legislation applies to all the people as it is is phrased: 'any man who, etc.' We therefore use the expression זה הדבר which appears on both occasions to conclude that the legislation in our paragraph also applies to all the men of Israel." Thus far the Talmud. Granted that the exegesis of this is valid, why did the Torah then have to add the words לבני ישראל, in our verse? Clearly the Baraitha did not understand the words לבני ישראל to mean that the legislation applied to the entire people why else would it have bothered to prove this indirectly by learning the גזרה שוה (similar wording) of זה הדבר in both instances? Moreover, the Talmud in Keritut 5 told us not to treat such a גזרה שוה lightly. We also need to understand the meaning of the word לאמור? To whom were the Israelites to convey this legislation? If the Torah meant that the heads of the tribes were supposed to convey this legislation to the Israelites the Torah should have written לאמור לבני ישראל, "to t...

אל ראשי המטות, “to the leaders of the tribes;” It would be their task to enforce this law. An alternate interpretation by Ibn Ezra: this paragraph was revealed to the people after the punitive expedition against Midian, seeing that these verses are continuous until the end of verse three. Rashi claims that the manner in which Moses ensured that the respective legislation reached the people was the same as in this instance, and he proves it from Exodus 34,3132 where the Torah wrote: 'וישובו אליו אהרן וגו, “and all of them returned to Moses, i.e. Aaron, the princes, etc.”This particular verse was spoken by Moses when he had just descended from Mount Sinai on the Day of Atonement equipped with all the commandments. Rashi adds here that the reason this formula has been used here by the Torah especially, is in order to teach that annulling vows can only be done by a judge authorised to do so, or in the absence of such by three laymen. This law has a unique feature in that a single judge, if an expert in that legislation is empowered to do so. The reference to the leaders of the tribes shows that such individuals possess special powers, whereas the words: “and to the Children of Israel,” mean that three laymen can accomplish the same as an expert without a colleague. This is stated in the Talmud tractate Nedarim folio 78, where Rav Acha says that the words: “Aaron, his sons, and the Children of Israel,” teach that an ad hoc court of three laymen can perform this task. If so, why does the Torah stress that this legislation be revealed foremost to the heads of the tribes, suggesting that these are people of superior knowledge? This suggests the opposite, i.e. that laymen are excluded!? Rabbi Chisda states that this is to teach that when an individual is indeed an expert in the legalese required, he can act independently. זה הדבר אשר צוה ה, “this is the matter that the Lord has commanded:” The Torah did not reveal where G-d commanded the following law to Moses. This is only one of numerous prophetic announcements by Moses where the time and location where Moses received these instructions has not been revealed. Examples quoted by our author are: Exodus 10,3, Exodus 11,4, Exodus 32,27 and his commentary there.

ירא את ה' בני ומלך, עם שונים אל תתערב, “Fear the Lord my son and the king, do not associate with those who keep changing” (Proverbs 24,21). In this verse Solomon warns man to fear the Lord, Hashem, first and foremost, and to fear the mortal king only as someone subordinate to Hashem. He applies the same term יראה, “fear, awe,” as applicable to man’s relations with higher authority be it celestial or terrestrial. The message is: “just as you must fear the Lord Who is everywhere at all times and you must abstain from sin because you know you are being watched although you cannot see the One Who watches you, so you must be in awe of the terrestrial king even when he is not present seeing he can decree death upon you even when he personally has not seen you sin.” It is simply not possible for a mortal king to be in all parts of his domain all the time. Instead of taking advantage of his temporary absence to violate his laws you must engrave in your heart the appropriate degree of awe and fear to help you not to transgress his laws. Simply remember that this is the way you relate to the supreme authority whom you cannot see but whose eye is upon you all the time. “Do not associate with the ones who keep changing” This is a warning not to display more fear for the visible terrestrial king (because he is visible) than for the invisible celestial king in the event the decrees of the celestial king and those of the terrestrial king are in conflict with one another. There are many people who are concerned first and foremost with what they perceive to be the danger from the local authority. They fear for their lives perceiving the power of terrestrial authority to be immediate and that of G’d to be relatively remote. Solomon warns against such perceptions and conduct based on such faulty perceptions. Seeing that G’d is not only the ultimate authority of the private citizen but also that of the terrestrial king it would be foolish to be more afraid of mortal kings than of immortal G’d. The reason that Solomon interposed the word בני, “my son,” between the word Hashem and the word king, is to emphasize the difference between the two although he had told you first to relate with “fear” to both of them. If not for this consideration, Solomon should have written: בני ירא את ה' ומלך, as he does in other similar instances when the verse commences with the word בני. The difference between G’d and a mortal king is as great as the difference between day and night. The basic message of our verse is that fear of the terrestrial authority in the guise of a king is something absolutely necessary as otherwise earth would be in a state of chaos, anarchy. This is also why our sages (Avot 3,2) have instructed us to pray for the well being of the government (any government) as without such a government, i.e. legally appointed authority, the world would revert to tohu vavohu and people would tear each other apart as a daily occurrence. Nonetheless, the even more important kind of fear without which the terrestrial universe would not endure is the fear vis-a-vis Hashem, the ultimate authority in the universe. The lives of all earthly kings are in His hands and terrestrial power is only delegated power. In order to remind us of all this, Solomon said in Kohelet 8,2: “I counsel you: ‘obey the king’s command and that in the manner of an oath to G’d.’” Concerning the whole subject of how to relate to imposed authority Solomon means that he views it as important to obey the king’s laws because a king is someone who perceives himself as duty bound to observe the KING’S command. When the terrestrial king fails to honour his king’s laws, i.e. no longer views himself as bound by G’d’s laws, his subjects’ obligation to obey him is no longer valid. Sinaitic law which we accepted by means of a solemn oath precedes and therefore overrides legislation by any terrestrial king. The Midrash (Vayikra Rabbah 33,6) understands the verse we quoted from Kohelet as follows: “I am obligated to obey the decrees of the Gentile nations who rule over me (Israel in the Diaspora) as far as their imposing taxes, head-duties, etc., is concerned. However, על דברת שבועת אלו-הים, concerning a matter which is an obligation by oath vis-a-vis G’d, I am not required to obey the king’s laws.” This is why we find that Chananyah, Mishael, and Azaryah said to Nevuchadnezzar (Daniel 3,16) “behold we are not concerned about this matter; behold there is a G’d Whom we worship — He is able to save us.” The verse had commenced with: “Shadrach, Mishach, and Abed Nego” (the Chaldaen names of Chanayah, Mishael and Azaryah) answered the king: O Nevuchadnezzar, we are not concerned, etc.” Why would the three men have been described first as answering the “king”, when in the same breath they address him by his title, i.e. as Nevuchadnezzar? Surely either one of these descriptions is enough! The fact is that they meant: “you are indeed the king over us concerning matters of taxes, etc.” But when you presume to command us to worship idols you are overstepping your authority seeing we cannot violate an oath we have taken hundreds of years before you ever were king, i.e. the oath we took at Mount Sinai.” This is the meaning of ועל דברת שבועת אלו-הים in the verse from Proverbs which we quoted at the outset. It is a well known fact that the whole subject matter of an oath is related to fear of and reverence for the Lord. Man is not supposed to utter the name of the Lord even in an oath which testifies to the truth, much less so in an oath in which he perjures himself by using the name of the Lord. It happened once (Bamidbar Rabbah 22,1) during the reign of King Yannai, that this king who had ten thousand towns under his control lost them all (they were destroyed) due to an oath which was true. How was this possible? A person would say to his friend: “I swear by G’d that I will go to a certain place and eat such and such.” The people in these towns were in the habit of confirming all their intentions by using such a formula involving the name of the Lord. Although these people all lived up to the undertakings they had made, their towns were ruined as they should not have involved the name of the Lord unnecessarily. If this is what happens to people to swear truthfully, we can imagine what must be in store for people who swear falsely. The story teaches how very careful we must be not to render a needless oath. There is no sin as great as that of swearing falsely or merely using the name of the Lord in an unnecessary oath. Seeing that the Torah describes man’s nature as evil from birth (Genesis 8,21) and as a result he tends to be angry a lot, his anger often causes him to swear oaths about what he will not do. The Torah, in its customary manner of providing the remedy before the disease has struck, here introduces the legislation of oaths and vows and how such can be annulled by either one expert or three ordinary adults. 'וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות לבני ישראל לאמור: זה הדבר אשר צוה ה', “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the Children of Israel to say: ‘this is the thing that Lord has said.’” According to the plain meaning of the text the words לבני ישראל mean that the leaders of the tribes are to convey this legislation to the Children of Israel. However, our sages in Nedarim 78 explained that the dual wording “the heads of the tribes”, followed by “the Children of Israel,” implies that either a single expert or a quorum of three ordinary men are authorized to annul vows under certain conditions. The reason this portion has been recorded immediately after the chapter dealing with the mussaf offerings on the festivals is that at the conclusion of that chapter (verse 39) the Torah had mentioned the vows that are generally brought as gifts to the Lord on most of these festivals when the owner of the animals vowed is in Jerusalem on his pilgrimage. This is also the reason why in our verse the Torah adds אשר צוה ה', “which the Lord has commanded;” the Torah reminds us that apart from vows which are made in honor of Hashem there are also others of a more profane nature; one must fulfill all one’s undertakings regardless whether this is an undertaking (vow) made to G’d or to man. Another reason for these additional words “which the Lord has commanded,” is that just as sanctifying the Holidays requires calendar expertise so dissolving a vow also requires expertise if it is performed by a single individual.

And Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes. What did he say to the heads of the tribes to tell the children of Israel? He spoke to the heads of the tribes that they should say something to the children of Israel, but he had not yet specified what the heads of the tribes should say to the children of Israel, until he told them the section about vows, where the head of the tribe is obligated to say to the one who makes a vow, “It is permitted to you.” And this is the statement that He commanded the heads of the tribes to say to the children of Israel. And regarding this He said, He shall not profane his word — he himself shall not profane it, but others can nullify his word. And concerning this He said, According to all that comes out of the mouth of the sage who permits it to him, so shall he do, whether to fulfill or to permit.

וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות, Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes, etc.” Nachmanides writes that seeing previously the Torah had written: “excepting your various offerings in fulfillment of vows, etc.,” (29,39), and those vows had involved only vows made to G’d, not personal vows made to oneself as in the chapter commencing here, the Torah now reminds the people that any utterance made by a human being in the form of a vow or oath, (or even without such a specific formulation) he must honour. [There is no such concept as “this is between me and myself, no one else’s concern.” Ed.] Other commentators see in the fact that the following legislation was addressed in the first instance to the heads of the tribes, i.e. judicial heads, a hint that if someone refuses to honour vows he has made or oaths he has sworn, he is being punished physically until he recants his refusal and agrees to honour the vow in question. Nachmanides writes further that seeing that contrary to common practice, this chapter has not been prefaced by the introductory line “G’d spoke to Moses telling him to say to the Israelites,” or something similar, the Torah makes up for this omission at the end of the chapter (verse 17) by stating that “these are the statutes that G’d had commanded Moses, etc.” ראשי המטות לבני ישראל, “the heads of the tribes of Israel.” These were the ones who replaced the first generation of such princes, carriers of the various banners, who had included such illustrious figures as Nachshon ben Aminadav, who had courageously entered the sea of Reeds before it had been split. It is possible that the men referred to here were the ones mentioned in the chapter dealing with the distribution of the parcels of land in the as yet non-existent State of Israel, (Numbers 34,17-28). Alternately, we may be speaking of different men, seeing that in Numbers 34 the Torah speaks about something that would come to pass later, after Moses had left the scene. Or, the men mentioned in chapter 34 were all alive and well 14 years after Joshua took over and was in a position to make the allocation of most of these lands. The reason why the Torah here uses the unusual formulation of ראשי המטות instead of saying: ”to all the Children of Israel,” is simply that there was no need for all of the Israelites to be taught rules applying to a narrow aspect of the relationship between a wife and her husband or a father with a daughter below twelve and a half years old. The vows discussed here are only those that result in interference with the father’s, or husband’s quality of life, עינוי נפש. Perhaps there was a need at this time to withhold these laws from them so that they would not begin to become negligent concerning the whole subject of vows, knowing that their husbands were able to rescue them from a foolish vow. At any rate, the spiritual leaders of the people could be entrusted with this legislation without it being filtered through the High Priest and the seventy elders first. Mention of the individual leaders of the tribes is also an oblique hint on which the sages later on may have based themselves, when allowing an individual who possesses the necessary expertise to annul such vow, without recourse to a lay court of at least three people. It is a fact that the Torah nowhere spells out a procedure for annulling vows generally, other than the specific vows mentioned here which are subject to annulment only by the father or husband, and only within 24 hours of their becoming aware of them. The whole legislation of annulling vows and how and by whom is הלכה למשה מסיני, a law handed down orally since the time of Moses, something that cannot be arrived at by the use of our logic in interpreting the written Torah. Our sages, in referring to this, describe it as hanging by a thread as thin as a hair on our heads.” (Compare Chagigah 10) Another expression used there is that this entire legislation, its various rules are “flying in thin air.” The “hint” we mentioned, consists of the Torah writing that the party making the vow לא יחל את דברו, “he must not profane his word,” instead of the Torah having written לא יעבור על דברו, “he must not violate his verbal undertaking.” This enabled the sages to save the applicant from violating his vow if he could find an opening, פתח, primarily by establishing that when making the vow the person who made it did not foresee certain circumstances which, if he had foreseen them, he never would have made such a vow in the first place. Seeing that this is so, the Torah did not reveal this legislation to the people at large, else too many people would become irresponsible and make vows lightheartedly.

וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות, I was asked by people in some town in France, Anyon, where else we find a portion commencing with the words וידבר משה, without being told first that G’d had told Moses to deliver the message or legislation in question to the people. My answer to the question was that we had read in Numbers 29,39 אלה תעשו לה' במועדיכם לבד מנדריכם ומנדבותיכם, “These you are to present to the Lord,” i.e. sacrifices which you have to present on one of the three pilgrimage festivals, seeing that everyone who is tardy is guilty of a serious misdemeanour, as we know from Rosh Hashanah 4. It was no more than natural that after he heard this Moses went and told the heads of the tribes, the judges all the details pertaining to all kinds of vows, including those between husband and wife, etc. The words איש כי ידור נדר, refer to a person vowing to bring a voluntary sacrifice, just as the words או השבע שבועה mean that he phrases this vow in a negative manner. When the Torah adds that such a person must not יחל his word, the meaning is that he must not be late in fulfilling his vow else he is considered as having broken his promise, i.e. delay carrying out his word, his promise. He has only until (according to one view) the next pilgrimage festival to come to Jerusalem and make good on his vow. Seeing that at that time he must come to Jerusalem at any event, this does not impose any kind of hardship on him. The expression יחל in the sense of delaying, procrastinating, occurs several times in Scripture, for instance in Judges 3,25 ויחל עד בוש, “he waited an embarrassingly long time.” Or, in Genesis 8,10 ויחל עוד שבעת ימים, we read that Noach waited another seven days before sending out the dove again. In Psalms 130,7 David speaks of יחל ישראל אל ה', meaning that Israel is to continue to wait for G’d hopefully. Anyone translating the words לא יחל דברו as “he must not profane, dishonour his word,” as the plain meaning of the verse is in error.

וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות וגו'...זה הדבר אשר צוה ה,“Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of Israel....this is what the Lord has commanded.” When Rabbi Sh’muel son of Meir, a grandson of Rashi, was asked where we can find that the legislation concerning vows was commanded to Moses, he directed the questioner to what has been written in the Torah immediately prior to our portion, namely: “these are the rules concerning the festivals for the Lord, apart from your vows, etc. “(Numbers, 29 39) The reference is to free willed vows and free will offerings, etc. There is also another category of vows, which is discussed in the Torah. Our verse refers to the chapter 28 in Numbers which commences with rules concerning sacrificial offerings.

A man who makes a vow before Hashem, or confirms an oath to bind himself with a binding — he shall not nullify his word; according to all that comes out of his mouth he shall do.

נדר A VOW — This is when one says, Behold, I take upon myself an obligation which is as sacred to me as an offering, that I will not eat, or that I will not do such-and-such a thing. — One might think that if he swears that he will eat the flesh of an animal which has not been slaughtered properly according to the rite that I may apply to him the text, “He shall do according to all that goeth forth from his mouth”! It, however, says, “[If he takes an oath] to forbid something to himself”, i.e., to forbid for himself something which is permissible to him — and not to make permissible that which is forbidden to him (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4). לא יחל דברו This is the same as לא יחלל דברו (the root of יחל being חלל): He shall not make his own word to bear a secular character (חולין) (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4; see also Rashi on Leviticus 21:4).

IF A MAN ‘YIDOR NEDER’ (VOWETH A VOW). “[This means if] a person says: ‘May there be konam upon me that I shall not eat, or that I shall not do such-and-such a thing.’ I might think that even [if he vowed] that he would eat n’veilah [which is forbidden by the Torah to be eaten] I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond, which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do it].” This is Rashi’s language. But the text of the Sifre is not so. Instead the Rabbis taught there [the following explanation] of [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond: “I might think that even if ‘he swore’ to eat n’veiloth and treifoth, abominable things and reptiles, I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond, which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to bind himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah].” Thus the Rabbis [in the Sifre] mentioned this matter in connection with shevuoth (oaths), and the Rabbi [Rashi] changed it to apply to nedarim (vows). And in my opinion he was not mindful [about this], for the Rabbis have said that in the case of vows one makes the [actual] object [referred to in the vow] forbidden to oneself [as when one says: “May this bread be konam upon me”], and therefore [vows] do not take effect upon non-tangible matters, such as when one says, “A vow be upon me that I shall not speak to you, or that I shall not walk, or that I shall not sleep,” and similar expressions [affecting non-tangible matters]. Now this being so, it would appear that even in the case of a permitted object, if one said: “A vow be upon me that I shall eat today,” or “that I shall eat this loaf,” it is not a [valid] vow since this vow does not have any object at all on which to take effect, but [was expressed in such a way as to impose] a duty upon him [personally] to do it. And we do not find mentioned anywhere in the Gemara vows about [matters which require one] to “get up and do” [a particular action, but only about matters which require one to abstain from certain things, such as when he says, “May this loaf be konam upon me,” in which case he must fulfill the vow by not eating it]. And although we find in the case of vows [to G-d Who is] on high [that they are valid if uttered in the following manner]: “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,” or “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a peace-offering” [which would seem to indicate that vows do take effect when expressed as an obligation resting upon a person, and not, as explained above, that they only take effect upon a specific object whic...

"To Hashem" — meaning he has invoked the Name in the vow: if such-and-such comes to pass, I will give to Hashem so-and-so, or I will afflict myself. "Swearing" — this is a verbal noun (infinitive), and it occurs alongside a noun; there are many like it. "He shall not desecrate his word" — [this] is like "he shall not profane [יחלל]," and it is not the language of pardon [מחילה]. Now we are dependent on tradition, for Scripture says "a man" and "a woman" but does not specify when [the law applies to] a man and when it applies to a woman.

איש כי ידור נדר, When a man vows a vow, etc. Why did the Torah repeat both the word נדר, vow, and the word שבעה, oath? Why could the Torah not simply have written איש כי ידור לה׳ או ישבע? Furthermore, why did the Torah phrase observance both in a positive and in a negative connotation, i.e. "he must not profane his word, as well as he must do in accordance with what came out of his mouth?" I believe we must look for the key to the way the Torah worded this legislation by remembering that there are two categories of vows and oaths. One category is related to a person's soul, i.e. he may undertake to study Torah, give a certain amount of charity, refrain from abominable practices, not to visit places predominantly visited by women, etc. The other category of vows and oaths pertains to the body and involves matters which are neither forbidden to us nor are we commanded to do them. Here too there are two divisions; one may vow to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or live in a certain house, etc. Or, one may undertake on oath not to eat certain things, drink certain liquids, or wear certain clothes. G'd legislated here how a person should best conduct himself. The words כי ידור נדר, i.e. an ordinary vow involves an undertaking to go to a certain place or to perform a certain task. The addition of the word לה׳ means that different rules apply when the vow is not of a secular nature but relates to one's conduct vis-a-vis G'd. The addition of this word therefore means that the word נדר has not been repeated at all, but that once it applies to secular vows and once to religious vows. The Torah goes on או השבע שבעה, "or he swears an oath, etc." In the first instance the oath concerns something one undertakes not to do as stated here לאסור אסר על נפשו, "to deny himself something." Here too we have two categories of oaths. One may swear not to do something which is already forbidden, as Boaz did when he wanted to reinforce his resolution not to sin by swearing an oath. The Torah was very astute in separating the word "vow" from the word "oath" by interposing the word "to G'd," to alert us to the fact that the reason both the word נדר and the word שבעה have been repeated is to allude to vows or oaths of a religious nature. Such religious vows or oaths are not subject to the same rules which govern vows or oaths of a secular nature. The words לא יחל דברו, "he must not profane his word," refer to vows and oaths which involve abstaining from something of a purely secular nature such as Boaz' oath; the rule which applies is: "he must not break his word; however, a collegium of judges has the power to annul the vow or oath in question (compare Nedarim 14). With respect to vows involving matters of religious significance, such as declaring something sacred for use only by the Temple treasury, etc., or oaths of a religious nature, the words which are applicable are: "everything which his mouth has uttered he shall do." Another reason why the Torah wrote ...

או השבע שבועה לאסור איסר, “or swears an oath to declare something permitted to others as forbidden to himself;” what is the difference between making a “vow” and “swearing an oath,” seeing both place something out of bounds to the party making such a declaration?When making a vow the object of the vow is placed out of bounds to the party who makes such a vow, whereas when swearing an oath, the party swearing it places himself out of bounds to the object or people that are the subject of such an oath. Even though the Torah has not spelled this out specifically, we find hints that this is so in the wording used by the Torah to describe these two kinds of self imposed restrictions. (Compare Sifri) If someone says: “by the Life of Hashem and by your own life, I am not going to abandon you,” he is stating that Hashem is alive, and that the party to whom he makes such a statement is alive. Using the name of the Lord as relevant to one’s own standing, is something which makes it such a severe sin if it turns out that one does not honour such a vow or oath. לא יחל דברו, “he must not delay fulfillment of his words indefinitely.”Alternately, he must not profane his own solemn undertaking by not honouring it.” We find this expression used in this sense in Psalms 130,7: 'יחל ישראל אל ה, “keep faithfully waiting, o Israel for Hashem fulfilling His undertakings” where the Psalmist has G-d urging Israel to wait patiently for G-d to honour His vows. G-d can be depended on to fulfill His vows or oaths. The party failing to fulfill his vow must not profane himself by doing so. However, others, i.e. a legal court have the power to release him from the obligations he imposed himself at a time of personal stress, not realising all the implications of what he had said at that time. (Talmud tractate Chagigah, folio 10).

איש כי ידור נדר לה', “when a man vows a vow unto the Lord;” according to the plain meaning of these words the expression “a vow unto the Lord,” does not mean that the person making such a vow or swearing such an oath had to use the name of the Lord when making his undertaking, but it means that even if he merely says “I vow to do a certain thing,” or “I vow not to do a certain thing,” such statements are binding and anyone violating them is committing a major sin unless said vow or oath had been legally annulled or dissolved. In order to make this point plain, the Torah did not write in connection with swearing an oath: או השבע שבועה לה', but merely או השבע שבועה, deliberately refraining from bringing the name “Hashem” into the example described. If you were to ask why the word 'לה is written in connection with נדר at all, the reason is to teach that if one makes a vow concerning matters which belong to G’d anyway, that legally speaking such a vow is valid and failing to fulfill it is a sin. For example: if someone were to declare that “eating unleavened bread on the night of the Passover is forbidden for me by reason of this vow,” although he is in no position to cancel G’d’s commandments and we might have thought that his words had no legal standing at all, the Torah reminds you that it has. Unless such a person will have such a vow annulled he is punishable if he honors it. This is also why our sages say on that same folio in Nedarim that the words נדר לה' teach that regardless of whether such a vow involves a commandment or something merely permitted but not mandatory, it is legally valid. The difference between a “vow” and an “oath” may be understood as follows: An oath involving a Biblical commandment is legally completely ineffective (though use of the Lord’s name in it is a cardinal sin regardless). If someone swears not to honour a certain law of the Torah, say that he swears not to lay phylacteries, he will receive 39 lashes in respect of a useless oath. The legal difference between these two similar sounding undertakings is that in an undertaking known as “vow,” the person undertaking it puts a certain object (in our example unleavened bread) out of bounds for himself. This is legally possible. In the example of the oath not to lay phylacteries, he does not place an object out of bounds but he places himself out of bounds concerning such objects. Seeing that as a Jew his obligation to lay phylacteries has preceded his present oath, i.e. his person has been predestined to lay phylacteries by a covenant dating back to Sinai, he cannot now arbitrarily cancel that covenant. Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 3,7 points out that the difference between vows on the one hand and oaths on the other is reflected in the wording of the Torah in Leviticus 5,4 where the Torah writes: נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים להרע או להיטיב, “a person who swears an oath with the lips to either deny himself something or to indulge in something, etc.” Maimonides understands the word להרע as referring to the person himself, i.e. intransitively [quite extraordinary grammatically, Ed.], whereas the expression להיטיב is also understood intransitively i.e. that he wants to indulge himself and confirms his intention by means of a vow. In the first instance, a suitable example would be that he plans to deny himself food or drink on a certain day, or he wishes to indulge in certain foods or drink on that day i.e. something which he is at liberty to do, but is not obliged to do. When the Torah discusses a vow rather than an oath, the wording is ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה he must act in accordance with everything that has come out of his mouth (verse 3 in our chapter here). In other words, the vow is valid regardless of whether it pertained to something mandatory or to something only permissible but not mandatory. This also explains the choice of the word איש with which the Torah describes the person initiating the vow, whereas in Leviticus such a person is describes as נפש “a person,“ i.e. it is immaterial if he is a grown up or a minor. When, in our situation, the person who made the vow is a male 12 years and over or a female 11 years and over they were examined as to whether they understand what is implied by their making such a vow. If they are shown to be mentally mature, their vows are valid, if not, their vows are not valid. If either of them has reached biological maturity, usually 13 years of age in the case of a boy and 12 years of age in the case of a girl, their vows are valid without mental examination. The same applies if such biological minors made over property to the Temple treasury (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,1). If they can be seen to know the full impact of what they are doing they need only be 12 or 11 years old respectively to be legally liable for their words. This ruling is known as Halachah leMoshe miSinai, i.e. as Sinaitic in origin, not spelled out in detail in the written Torah, and the logic for this distinction not having being revealed to us. In the Talmud Temurah 2, the basis for this ruling is attributed to Leviticus 27,2 where the Torah writes איש כי יפליא נדר, וג'. The apparently superfluous and unusual word יפליא is regarded as the basis for a biological minor being held liable for vows he pronounced under the circumstances discussed earlier. Seeing that, as we explained, the vow is applicable equally to matters which are permissible and matters which are mandatory, when a person vowed not to eat on the Sabbath (by declaring the food as out of bounds to him on that day) he will have to fast as penance for having violated the commandment to “enjoy” the Sabbath, i.e. by means of eating more frequently and better quality food on it than on weekdays. The same does not apply when the same person used the formula of an oath to deny himself food on the Sabbath, as, seeing such an oath would be legally invalid, keeping it has no consequences regarding atoning for his conduct by fasting afterwards as a sign of penance. If someone vowed that food is out of bounds to him on a weekday he does not have to fast as penance if he observed his vow as there is no commandment to eat on those days. If he vowed that food is out of bounds for him on Chanukah or New Moon, days which have the status of a holiday by rabbinical decree only, he needs to fast for having violated the proper observance of such a day, seeing that his vow was valid and as a result he violated a rabbinical decree. Some halachic authorities hold that in the examples quoted last the person who made the vow may defer observing it until after the New Moon, (assuming he had specified a certain day of the week for his vow, being unaware at that time that that day would coincide with New Moon). There are opinions that the status of New Moon as a quasi holiday is Biblical rather than rabbinical and therefore the same rule applies as if he had vowed that food is out of bounds for him on the Sabbath. Regarding the validity of vows when they conflict with Sabbath legislation, for instance, some authorities hold that this is restricted only to vows whose fulfillment involves passivity, such as abstaining from food on the Sabbath, not when fulfillment involves an activity which violates the Sabbath (Radbaz 5 on Maimonides Nedarim 3,9). This is reflected in Taanit 12 that if a person vows to fast (place food outside his domain) every Monday and Thursday of the year and it happens that on one or more of these days there occurs a festival listed in the Megillat Taanit as such, if he made the vow before the Rabbis instituted this festival his vow overrides it. If the Rabbis had decreed such a festival prior to his having made his private vow, the rabbinical decree overrides, i.e. automatically invalidates the vow of the private individual. Although this ruling appears to contradict what we said previously regarding Biblical laws which certainly preceded any vow made by an individual, the reason for the ruling in Taanit is that the sages saw the need to reinforce their decrees and to lend it weight precisely because people might say that such laws are “only” rabbinical and carry less authority. (Maimonides concurs in Hilchot Nedarim 3,9). Some authorities understand the expression ידחה in the Talmud which we translated as “postponing applicability of one’s vow,” to mean that such a person should consult with a scholar or Bet Din to have his vow set aside altogether seeing he had based it on a mistaken premise (Nachmanides end of chapter 9 of Nedarim). If a person employed the formula usually used to pronounce an oath in order to make a vow, or vice versa, the sages in the Jerusalem Talmud are divided in their opinions as to the respective validity of such undertakings when they conflict with other existing commitments which this person is bound by. The sages there rule that the most stringent interpretation of either oath or vow is applied in such cases simultaneously. Let us turn to a practical example of what we just said: If someone utters an oath or vow concerning something he was obligated to either do or refrain from doing (as the case may be) he is treated as if he had sworn an oath to cancel a decree from the Torah as being applicable to him. As a result he is subject to the penalty of receiving 39 lashes. This penalty is applied even if the prohibition violated was only rabbinical such as drinking wine which was left uncovered so that a Gentile may have touched it while no Jew was watching. Another example would be if someone had vowed to eat the product of a grapevine to which another species of fruit had been grafted in the Diaspora by Gentiles (compare Maimonides Hilchot Maachalot Assurot 10,8). A third example is eating a mixture of fowl and milk, something forbidden “only” by rabbinical decree (Maimonides Hilchot Maachalot Assurot 9,4). Consider further that it is forbidden to climb a tree on New Year’s Day to fulfill the commandment of blowing the shofar when the only shofar available is located on such tree. The Rabbis forbade climbing trees on Sabbaths or Holidays (Rosh Hashanah 32). This poses the problem of fulfillment of a Biblical commandment which preceded a rabbinical decree not being possible without violating such rabbinical decree. This brings us to our verse above. When we read in verse 3 of our chapter here about someone who “swears an oath to establish a prohibition upon himself, that he shall not desecrate his word,” our sages in Sifri 153 state that this refers to something which was permitted to the individual swearing the oath prior to his swearing this oath. If he had sworn an oath intending to permit something for himself which was forbidden to him by Jewish law, the oath most certainly is invalid and the Torah’s warning not to desecrate his personal word does not apply. If someone overhears a second person swearing an oath or making a vow or inviting bystanders to join him and he wishes same to apply to himself also, he only has to say אמן in answer to what he heard the first party say. If the party who said אמן violates said oath or vow he is as guilty as if he himself had formulated it in the first place. Not only that, but even if the person formulating the vow or oath was a minor or a Gentile, the word אמן by the Jew who overheard him obligates him to fulfill the terms of such a vow or oath (Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 2, 1-2). The above does not only apply to the word אמן, but to other words having a similar meaning such as the word כן, “yes., or if he said: “this oath obligates me.” If the part formulating the oath had not used the tetragrammaton as the deity he swears by but one of the better known substitutes of the tetragrammaton such as “the one who is known as bestowing grace,” or: “the One who is merciful,” and certainly other names of G’d such as elohim, adonay, etc., the oath is valid. Even if the party formulating the oath had merely said: “cursed be anyone who does such and such a thing,” this is considered a form of oath and expressing agreement with the party who said this makes one a party to such a curse. In other words, extreme caution is advised so as to avoid being implicated and obligated by an oath or vow initiated by a third party. If someone intended that certain foods or drinks should be forbidden for him as if he had uttered an oath concerning them, this has no legal implication as long as he had not uttered the relevant words. This is why he Torah, when introducing the subject of oaths in Leviticus 5,4 uses the expression לבטא בשפתים “to give expression with one’s lips.” Resolutions which are made only with the heart are not legally binding. The same rule applies if someone unconsciously verbalizes an oath he had no intention of swearing. Seeing it does not reflect what was in his heart it has no legal validity An example would be that a person wanted to vow not to accept invitations to eat at the house of a certain person called Reuven. When he verbalized this vow he said “Shimon” instead of “Reuven.” Seeing this was a slip of the tongue, his vow is disregarded. Similarly, when someone meant to deny himself wheat bread on oath but mentioned barley by mistake he is allowed to eat both kinds of bread seeing the oath is not valid as what he said did not correspond to what he had in mind. What applies to oaths also applies to vows, i.e. heart and mouth must be in tandem. However, this rule does not apply if one had said אמן confirming someone else’s vow or oath. If that third party comes to a judge claiming he had made a slip of the tongue and what he said was not what he meant, the person who said אמן cannot be absolved from his oath as what he had said אמן to had corresponded to what he thought he said אמן to. If he violates the oath he heard the other party utter he will receive 39 lashes though the original party is not liable to punishment for violating it. If someone who has uttered a legally valid vow wishes to retract as he had second thoughts he may do so only during the few moments it takes to say the words שלום עליך רבי, “welcome to you my teacher.” If, during this period of time, he says “this is not an oath,” or words to that effect but brief, his oath is completely invalidated as it is the same as if he had erred in the formula of the oath when he uttered it. Maimonides confirms this in Hilchot Shevuot chapter 2. A Midrashic approach based on Tanchuma Mattot 1. On the words: איש כי ידור נדר לה' the Midrash quotes G’d as saying to the Israelites: ‘be careful before making a vow not to violate it, as if someone violates a vow he will eventually violate his oaths also.’ If that were to happen he is as if he had denied G’d and all aspects of the Jewish religion and there is no forgiveness for this as the Torah has told us in Exodus 20,7 that G’d will not completely exonerate anyone who has used His name in vain. We have another verse on this subject in Jeremiah 4,2: “and swear ‘as the Lord lives;’” G’d said to the people: “do not think that it is permissible to utter such a kind of oath as the prophet quotes.” There is a general prohibition of swearing an oath involving the name of G’d unless the people doing so possess the following characteristics: described in Deut. 10,20 as: “you shall revere the Lord your G’d to serve Him and to cling to Him--and to swear in His name.” Only when you have fulfilled the conditions set out in the first half of this verse are you allowed to swear an oath using the name of the Lord. A kabbalistic approach: the word ידור in the line איש כי ידור נדר is related to דירה, “dwelling.” The word לה' means that the vow is directed to the Lord Who is the דירתו של עולם, “the dwelling of the universe,” the G’d Who created His world and the seven celestial regions emanating from there. Anyone fulfilling his vows is as if he thereby confirms his belief in this dwelling of the Lord in those regions, whereas anyone defaulting on his vows is as if he denied such beliefs. The former is assured that his soul will return to that dwelling, whereas the ones failing to honour their vows will be removed from those domains permanently The word נדר alludes to a certain thing and its opposite, i.e. the establishment of a dwelling or the uprooting of it. [According to Rabbi Chavell the dagesh in the letter ד permits it to be read as if the word were ינדור, derived from בינה. If one employs one’s בינה one establishes a claim to a permanent dwelling in the celestial spheres for oneself, i.e. within these seven celestial regions. If one fails to so one achieves the reverse.] The same is true of people who honour their oaths or violate them. If they honour them they enter the domain of these seven celestial dwellings; if not, they forfeit that entitlement. The word שבועה is a clear allusion to these seven regions. It is well to note how Moses phrased this legislation when he commenced with זה הדבר אשר צוה ה'. He continues with איש כי ידור נדר לה', instead of merely saying איש כי ידור נדר אליו, repeating the word לה' unnecessarily. Moses had to repeat that word to allude to the power of the vow which is greater, i.e. above that of the שבועה, oath, a word limited to “seven” as it is derived from the word שבעה, seven, and subject to its limitations. Seeing that the vow possesses such a superior power it applies even to mandatory commandments and when one pronounces such a vow the wording of which overrides such a commandment this is not as if one had not said anything at all as is the case when one pronounces an oath the wording of which overrides such a commandment. The whole Torah legislation, i.e. the מצות, are products of the regions within these seven celestial regions They represent the seven different types of voices (sounds) the Israelites heard during the giving of the Torah as we explained in our commentary on Exodus 20,1. [Compare our translation ibid. Ed.] This also accounts for the fact that the preposition used by the Torah for the word שבועה, oath, is invariably the preposition ב, such as אשר נשבעת להם בך, (Exodus 32,13); בי נשבעתי (Genesis 22,16) or ובשמו תשבע (Deut. 6,13). נשבע ה' בימינו (Isaiah 62,8) “The Lord swore by His right hand,” Seeing that we learned in Nazir 3 that if someone says ימין [i.e. “by my right”] this is a form of oath, the idea of “swearing an oath” is associated with the party declaring it is a partner of the concept of the seven, שבעה, celestial regions and what they represent. The word נדר, vow, on the other hand, is always associated with the preposition ל, pointing at something above the object or party referred to by the one making the vow. We have Psalms 132,2 נדר לאביר יעקב, or here איש כי ידור נדר לה', or in Psalms 24,1: לה' הארץ ומלואה. When you appreciate what we have just pointed out you will understand the meaning of Sifri Mattot 153 that whereas when someone renders an oath he swears by the person of the king, when he vows a vow he swears by the life of the king. The essence of the king is his life, in the case of the Lord, His eternal life. The Sifri there points to Elisha saying to Elijah “by the life of the Lord and the life of your soul, I will not abandon you,” as an indication that the expression בחיי is the ultimate statement of this sort (Kings II 2,7). לא יחל דברו, “he must not desecrate his word.” The word is derived from חול, not to profane his word. Our sages explain this wording to mean that whereas the person who made the vow must not “profane,” it, others (three laymen or an expert) may do so (Chagigah 10). The annulment of a vow is possible if the person regrets what he vowed because he had not realised its full implications. He tells the court that had he known at the time he made the vow what he knows at that moment he would never have made the vow in the first place (compare Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 6,5). Having said this the lay judges or the expert will release him from his vow. The legal basis for this is that the vow is presumed to have been erroneous from the start and hence never valid. A person is not permitted to cancel his own oath, his own vow, or even the vow of his wife on his own (without recourse to such a tribunal). The reason the husband cannot release his wife from her vows is that legally she is considered as part of him, i.e. אשתו כגופו. The inability of the husband to cancel his wife’s vow applies only when the husband was acting as the solitary expert. A husband is allowed to be part of a quorum of three people who listen to the wife state that had she known what her vow entailed she would never have made the vow in the first place. No one, even a “so-called” expert, may annul a vow single-handedly if there is a scholar of greater reputation available locally. Neither may a scholar take such a decision in the presence of his teacher (even if he has surpassed the teacher in knowledge), unless his teacher has specifically given him permission to do so (Maimondes Hilchot Shevuot 6,3). ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה, “in accordance with whatever has come out of his mouth he shall do.” Nedarim 3 queries the need for this sentence seeing the Torah had already written that the person concerned must not profane his word. Answer: the Torah here teaches that a formula for vows which does not correspond exactly to the standard formula, i.e. “I vow to do such and such” is nonetheless binding on the party announcing an undertaking. The same applies to oaths. The Talmud elaborates; “if someone in the habit of mispronouncing a certain word due to a hare-lip lived in a town where they pronounce the word שבועה as מומתא and similar situations, then not only is the word מומתא accepted as binding for him, but even the normal distortion of that word which one could expect from a person with a speech defect is also binding upon him. The general rule is that in determining the validity of a vow or oath we are guided by the intention of the one making it not by the standard phonetic formula. All of this we derive from the additional words ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה. What matters is that he had resolved in his heart to do the thing he vowed, or to fail to do the thing he forbade himself on oath. This is so even if the name of the Lord or a substitute had not been uttered. If the person concerned violated his undertaking he is guilty of perjury. All of this is in order to lend additional weight to the seriousness of the sin of perjury, not honoring one’s undertaking. Nonetheless, there is a difference between not honoring an oath in which the name of the Lord had not been mentioned in that the guilty party does not receive 39 lashes and does not have to bring the sacrifice stipulated by the Torah for his sin (Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 2,4). Our sages in Chagigah 10 state that the whole legislation of annulling an oath or vow is “suspended in thin air,” i.e. is not anchored in definitive language in the written Torah. It is all based on our oral tradition This is the reason that the rabbis accepted the principle that both oath and vow are subject to retroactive annulment if the party concerned expresses regret. The reason that the Torah (oral) provided an escape hatch not found in the written Torah is that there are circumstances in life when a person is under severe emotional strain as a result of which he says things which he normally would not have said. The oral Torah makes allowance for this; the written Torah does not, as if it had the incidence of carelessly uttered oaths and vows would multiply. Not only that, if the party was aware that such vows could be annulled, he would add a rider while making a vow due to his anger that the procedure of annulling a vow should not apply to his vow. If he were to do this it would be impossible to release him from his foolish utterance unless he had first expressed regret at having added such a rider to his vow. Only after the scholar had released him from the rider he had added, would he then be able to turn to the same or some other scholar explaining that he was also sorry he had made the actual vow seeing he had not been aware of all that this entailed at the time he made the vow. The exception to all this is if the vow was made in public. Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 6,8 states that anyone swearing an oath in public can never be absolved from his oath. The definition of “in public” is in the presence of three people. This definition of the word רבים as “public,” is derived from the legislation of the זבה, a woman afflicted with involuntary vaginal discharge of blood. The Torah in Leviticus 15,25 speaks of this condition continuing for ימים רבים, “many days.” Seeing that the word ימים always means a minimum of two days, the additional word רבים is taken to mean three days or more (in the third chapter of Shevuot 29). The Talmud quotes Moses as telling the Israelites: “Know that I do not make you undertake an oath merely on my own behalf but also on behalf of G’d.” The Talmud asks why Moses had to say this? Why did he not merely say that they undertook this oath in his own presence? The answer given there is that he meant in the presence of G’d, His celestial tribunal, and himself. This was considered a public oath. Moses warned the Israelites that such a public oath could never be retracted. Nachmanides explains that 'on behalf of G-d' includes also the entire congregation of Israel, similar to what the Sages explain (Gen. 19,24) "and G-d rained down on Sodom etc." to include the heavenly court (Bereshit Rabbah 51,50). The only reason that Moses himself had to be part of this procedure was that he acted as the agent of the Jewish people vis-a-vis heaven. When the sages said that if someone swears a public oath such an oath can never be abolished this is so only when the annulment is not requested in order for the party bound by the oath to perform a commandment which he could not perform unless he had been released from his oath. This applies particularly to a commandment from which the community of the whole benefits, such as the writing of a Torah scroll. If the party bound by an oath not to write a Torah scroll was the foremost scribe in his town, it is possible to release him from such an oath (according to the view of Rabbeinu Tam in Gittin 36, Tosafot). Maimonides in Hilchot Shevuot 6,8-9 agrees with this. He phrases this as follows: “if one swears an oath in public or vows a vow in public such undertakings can never be annulled except for the performance of a commandment. How does this work in practice?” Say, a person had sworn publicly not to accept any benefit from a certain third party forever, and a situation arose when the people of his city needed a Mohel to perform the rites of circumcision for the child of the third party involved in that oath, the procedure outlined earlier for releasing someone from his oath may be invoked. The person who was under oath not to act as Mohel may perform the task, receive his payment even from the people concerning whom he had sworn not to accept any benefits. Alternatively, if the one who swore the oath was a ritual slaughterer at a time when he was not the only one in his town, and the other ritual slaughterer, שוחט, had become incapacitated so that the whole town would not have any meat unless the first שוחט was released from his oath, he can be released according to the standard formula we described. He is then also allowed to accept payment for the services he rendered. It would be an unnecessary harshness to release the party for the performance of only this particular commandment. Rashi does not agree that the only commandment which would cause this person to be able to be released from his oath is a commandment which no one else in that town could fulfill except him. Rashi believes that the expression in the Talmud על דעת רבים, which we translated as “in public,” does not mean that but means that he did so with the consent of the people who were witness to such an oath. Seeing that the people at large would not agree to someone committing himself on oath to a lifestyle that interferes with mitzvah-performance, they may be viewed as having disagreed concerning matters involving the performance of commandments by the person swearing the oath. As a result of their attitude the person qualifies to have his oath dissolved for the sake of performing any commandment. (compare Rashi Makkot 16). Nachmanides agrees with Rashi that even an oath contracted in public is subject to annulment for the sake of any commandment being performed thereby.

“A man who vows a vow to the Lord.” There are two types of vows, because one who vows in anger to prohibit something upon himself — such a vow is not for the Lord. Specifically, a man who vows — when he is a man settled in his mind, we read about him “the man with an oath” (Shevuot 26a), and he is one who vows to the Lord. But one who vows in anger, since anger rests in the bosom of fools (Ecclesiastes 7:9), is therefore not considered a “man” and is comparable to an animal. Our Sages (Nedarim 22a) spoke disparagingly of one who vows, saying that one who vows is as if he built a private altar, and one who fulfills such a vow is as if he offered a sacrifice upon it. As a sort of proof for their words, Rashi explained: “It says here this is the matter, and it says regarding sacrifices outside the Temple this is the matter, etc.” And I say, derive from this connection: Just as there it refers to a private altar, so too here it refers to a private altar. For sacrifices outside the Temple means offering on a private altar, and this is the matter mentioned here regarding one who vows speaks of offering on a private altar, because one who vows is similar to one who built a private altar. The reason for this is that the Torah understood the mindset of one who vows, for he prohibits upon himself what the entire world treats as permitted. Presumably, his haughtiness led him to separate himself from the entire congregation and remove himself from the community. And in this way we find in the language of our Sages (Chagigah 22a) that one should not go and build a private altar [bamah] for oneself, for all this is the path of pride and arrogance, as our Sages said (Sotah 4b): “Anyone who has haughtiness of spirit is as if he built a private altar [bamah], as it is said (Isaiah 2:22): Cease from man, whose breath is in his nostrils, for of what account [bameh] is he? Don’t read bameh [of what account] but ‘bamah’ [private altar].” What is the connection between a haughty person and one who builds a private altar? It must certainly be that due to his haughtiness, he builds a private altar for himself as mentioned. Also, the word “bamah” implies elevation. And the same path of pride and arrogance that is found in one who builds a private altar is also found in one who makes vows, because presumably his intention is to be regarded as pious and abstinent. However, one could argue that a person who makes a vow in anger proves otherwise, because presumably in his anger he did not intend it for the sake of arrogance. You must therefore distinguish between one who makes a vow with a settled mind and one who vows in anger. How would you know whether this person who vows resembles one who builds a private altar or not? If he vowed in anger, he certainly does not resemble one who builds a private altar. Concerning this, they said: “And one who fulfills it [the vow] is as if he offered a sacrifice on it [the private altar].” This gives a clear indication that whatever a person does out of anger, presumably when his anger subsides, he comes to regret it and does not fulfill it, but rather goes to a sage to annul it. Therefore, the text says that if he makes a vow and does not fulfill it, but rather seeks to have his vow annulled, it is certain that he vowed in anger and regrets it, and then he does not resemble one who built a private altar. As our Sages said (Chagigah 10a) regarding which I swore in My anger (Psalms 95:11) — in My anger I swore, and I retracted when the anger and wrath subsided. But one who fulfills it [a vow] and does not come to regret it and does not seek [rabbinic] release from it, the end proves that he made the vow with a settled mind, and the Torah suspects him that his arrogance brought him to this trait, that he set himself apart. Therefore, he is considered as if he offered a sacrifice on it [a private altar], because the fulfillment is the completion of his intention, just as the sacrifice is the purpose of building a private altar. And this is what is concluded there (Nedarim 22a): Shmuel said: Anyone who makes a vow is called wicked. What is the scriptural source? As it says: If you refrain from making vows, there will be no sin in you (Deuteronomy 23:23). And we learn [through a verbal analogy] from “refrain” to “refrain” — it is written if you refrain [from vowing] and it is written there: There the wicked refrain from angering (Job 3:16). It seems to me that we can derive from this comparison that just as there [in Job] it deals with refraining from anger, so too here it refers to refraining from anger. For one is only called wicked in this case: when his anger has already subsided, and nevertheless he stands by his vow and does not seek release from it. This reveals retroactively that he did not vow out of anger, since enough time has already passed for anger to subside. And about this it says: There the wicked refrain, meaning he is called wicked when the anger has ceased and he does not seek release from it. If so, he certainly vowed with a settled mind in order to build a private altar for himself. Therefore, one who fulfills it is called wicked, for the way of pride and arrogance is his. And I will add another verbal analogy, to learn from this [use of the word] refrain to refrain for yourselves from man, whose breath is in his nostrils, for of what account [bameh] is he? (Isaiah 2:22). Just as there [in Isaiah] it refers to a private altar [bamah], so too here it refers to a private altar. And this is what is said here: When a man makes a vow to the Lord — when he is a man in his vow, sound in his mind, and vowed with a settled mind — about him it says, by way of a statement: He shall do according to all that proceeds from his mouth, because he will not come to regret it in the end. But one who vows out of anger, about him it says: He shall not break his word, because he will end up seeking release from it when his anger subsides. And it says a vow to the Lord to exclude vowing out of arrogance, to build a private altar for himself, but rather one who vows for the sake of the Lord. “He shall not break his word.” However, others can break his word. The reason for the allowance of vows [to be annulled] by a single expert or by three laymen who are called a court: We learn from the annulment by a father and husband. Just as a father and husband have the power to annul [vows] because every woman is under the authority of her husband or her father, and she has no power to do anything major or minor without their consent, and it is as if they stipulated at the time of the vow “on condition that the husband or father agrees,” and when they do not agree, then retroactively the vow is nullified from its inception — because presumably she vowed with their consent in mind, or as if she vowed subject to their approval — so too, every Israelite is under the authority of the court and is obligated to do whatever the court instructs them, and anyone who makes a vow is as if they stipulated at the time of the vow “on condition that the court agrees with them,” and when they do not agree, the vow is uprooted from its foundation. And any single expert is called a court, as are any three laymen, therefore they have the power to release their vow to prevent them from sin, for anyone who makes a vow is called a sinner, as it is stated: But if you refrain from vowing, there will be no sin in you (Deuteronomy 23:23). And regarding why for a husband and father the language used is “annulment” [hafarah], while for a sage it is “release” [hatarah]: This is because a woman is more under the authority of her husband and father than all of Israel is under the authority of the court. Therefore, they are with a language that indicates complete nullification of the vow from its inception, as if there was never a vow at all. But the language of “release” indicates something that was initially forbidden for some time, and that prohibition was then released, for it is not completely annulled since the matter depends on regret (see Rambam, Laws of Vows 13:15, and Radbaz there).

איש כי ידור נדר לה', “If a man makes a vow to Hashem,” he vows to himself to honour Hashem. The reason we understand it in this fashion is that the Torah, otherwise, should have written בה'”, i.e. “in the name of Hashem,” or “invoking Hashem’s name.” Elsewhere, that is the prefix used in such cases as for instance in Genesis 21,23 השבעה לי באלוקים, “swear to me in the name of the Lord.”

(1) IMPOSING AN OBLIGATION ON HIMSELF ... HE SHALL NOT BREAK HIS PLEDGE. This refers to the votive offering. In other words, he must not delay his votive offering until after the festivals, as the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. For this is the explanation of "he shall not break [lo yahel]," as in (Jud. 3:25) "He waited [actually, "They waited"] a long time"; (Gen. 8:10) "He waited another seven days"; (Ps. 130:7) "O Israel, wait for the LORD" -- wait and anticipate Him. And one who explains [this] as an expression of desecration [hilul] according to the straightforward sense is in error. (2) HE MUST CARRY OUT ALL THAT HAS CROSSED HIS LIPS. This refers back to "taking an oath" (hishava sh'vu'ah) [i.e., not to "makes a vow" (yidor neder)] -- he must do according to what he specified in taking an oath, according to the time he specified, whether short or long. And a proof of the matter,of what these two things mean, is what Moshe said in Deuteronomy (23:22), "When you make a vow to the LORD your God, do not put off fulfilling it, ... You must fulfill what has crossed your lips and perform ...." Takes an oath, etc. ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה. This refers to the words השבע שבועה, meaning that the party concerned must do as he has sworn to do and in accordance with the date he had specified whether in the immediate future or at a later date. Proof that this is the correct interpretation of our verse is what Moses himself said in Deut. 23,22 כי תדור נדר לה' לא תאחר לשלמו “when you make a vow to the Lord your G’d, do not be tardy in paying it;” this is followed immediately by מוצא שפתיך תשמור ועשית, “the utterance that emanates from your mouth you shall honour, and carry out the respective undertaking.”

And a woman who makes a vow before Hashem and binds herself with a binding while in her father's house, in her youth —

בבית אביה [IF A WOMAN VOW] … BEING IN HER FATHER’S HOUSE — i.e., under her father’s control, but the law here stated applies even though she be not in his house, provided she be under his control (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:4). בנעורה IN HER YOUTH — when she is a נערה i.e., in the first state of womanhood, but not when she is a קטנה, a minor, and not when she is a בוגרת (in full womanhood); for so far as a minor is concerned, her vow is in general no vow (it is null and void ab initio), and a בוגרת is not under her father’s control so that he can annul her vows. What is a קטנה, a minor, in respect to vows? We may gather this from what our Rabbis said: a woman of eleven years and one day must have her vows investigated until she reaches the age of twelve years; if she understands in Whose name it is that she has made the vow or in Whose name it is she has dedicated the thing, her vow is a vow, but a woman of twelve years and a day does not require any investigation regarding her vow (Niddah 56b).

AND IF A WOMAN VOWETH A VOW UNTO THE ETERNAL … 5. AND HER FATHER HEARETH HER VOW. Scripture wanted to mention the [case of] prohibition first [in Verses 4-5, namely that if she makes a vow and her father is quiet about it or confirms it, then all her vows shall stand ..] in order to tell us that a young girl [in her father’s house] is also subject to the negative commandment mentioned [previously], that he shall not break his word, and therefore if her father confirms her vow [expressly or tacitly] the vow shall stand, but if he disallowed her, it shall not stand. And Scripture states [in conclusion], and the Eternal will forgive her, because her father disallowed her, in order to tell us that G-d will only forgive her if she acted [in disregard of her vow] after her father had disallowed it, but not [if she broke it] at the beginning, that is, if she [first] transgressed her vow and later on her father disallowed it, just as the Rabbis have said: “[The father or husband] ‘cuts off’ [the vow from the moment that he disallows it], but [unlike a Sage] he does not uproot it retrospectively.”

"And she binds a binding [וְאָסְרָה אִסָּר]" — or [the word is spelled] וְאָסְרָה אִסֵּר. [The form] וְאָסְרָה follows a different pattern and is not [the same] as [the noun] אֶסֶר.

ואשה כי תדור, “and if a woman makes a vow, etc.” A female of twelve years and over is called אשה, “a woman.” Her vows and oaths are legally valid. If she is between 11 and 12 years of age she is presumed to be a minor though she is examined if she understands the implication of a vow or an oath. If she does, she is subject to the same rules as a male between the ages of 12 and thirteen. If she is less than eleven years old she is a minor in all respects of the law. Her pronouncements have no legal standing whatever. If a female is over 12 years of age or a male over 13 years of age their vows or oaths are legally binding even if they did not know to whom [i.e. that this involves an undertaking vis-a vis G’d. Ed.] they made such commitments (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,1-3). This entire paragraph reveals many important laws concerning vows and oaths in very few words. The legal status of women concerning vows may be divided into four categories: 1) A נערה, girl between the age of 12-12 years and six months; 2) An ארוסה, a girl betrothed but not yet having moved in with her husband. 3) A married woman (after חופה); 4) A widow. When a נערה has a father she remains under his legal control and her father can invalidate her vows on the day he hears about them but not later. The logic behind this is that she would have attached a mental rider to her vow that her father would approve of it. If she finds that she was mistaken and her father objected upon hearing of it, her vow was never valid in the first place. The same logic does not apply to vows undertaken by a male of corresponding age. Just as the father is legally empowered to sell the services of his daughter to a stranger, an entitlement which does not extend to selling the services of his son, so the father is also legally entitled to countermand vows made by a daughter not yet fully of age. When such a נערה has attained the age of 12 years and six months she is considered adult in all legal respects and no longer under her father’s legal control (Niddah 47). She is fully responsible for all her vows and oaths, the same as a widowed woman or a divorcee. The words of verse 10: כל אשר אסרה על נפשה יקום עליה, “everything she has prohibited upon herself- shall remain upon her,” apply to such a 12 and a half year old single girl. If, while under the age limit, she made a vow and her father annulled it on the day he heard of it, it is as invalid as if it had never been uttered. When the Torah adds the words וה' יסלח לה, that “the Lord will forgive her,” the sages reasoned that these words are applicable when the girl who had made the vow is in need of forgiveness, such as when she violated her vow being unaware that her father had already canceled it (Niddah 47). Obviously, if someone commits what he or she perceives to be a violation of G’d’s law they are in need of forgiveness even if technically, for reasons unknown to them they did not commit a sin. As to the woman who has been betrothed. The Torah speaks here about a woman who prior to her betrothal made a vow or swore an oath and who enters the first stage of her marriage with such vows still valid. The Torah, by employing the words, ואם היו תהיה לאיש indicates that the girl (under 12 and a half years old) has not yet completely left her father’s domain and also has not yet come under the domain of her husband concerning his interest in the matter. Her father and husband-to-be must both annul her vows in order for such an annulment to be legally valid. This is what we learned in Nedarim 66 seeing that we presume that when she made the vow she mentally resolved that it would be with the approval of both her father and her husband-to-be. Both her father and her husband-to-be have to hear it on the same day in order for both of them together to be able to annul it. The Talmud adds, that if the fiance of the betrothed girl dies before she reaches the age of maturity and she had moved into her husband’s home (after חופה), she reverts to her father’s domain and he can cancel her vows as if she had made them before she was married. If her father died prior to her having become fully married, (חופה), her husband cannot annul her vows until after she is fully married to him (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,10).

and her father hears her vow and her binding with which she has bound herself, and her father keeps silent toward her — then all her vows shall stand, and every binding with which she has bound herself shall stand.

ושמע אביה את נדרה..וקמו כל נדריה, and her father hears about her vow;….all her vows shall stand." We need to understand why the verse first speaks about "her vow" in the singular and then continues to speak about "her vows" in the plural. Besides, why did the Torah add the word: "all" both times. It would have sufficed to write: "her vows and oaths will stand," without adding the word "all" each time. Furthermore, why does the Torah use a different future tense when speaking about her vows, i.e. וקמו, whereas when speaking about an oath the woman uttered, it uses the word יקום to indicate that "it will stand?" The word יקום was altogether superfluous as the word וקמו which appeared earlier in the same verse would have referred to both vow and oath. We may be able to explain the wording the Torah used in our verse with the help of what we learned in Nedarim 87. The Mishnah says there: "If she said 'I swear that I will not eat either these figs or grapes,' and her husband confirms the part about her not eating figs, he has confirmed the entire vow. If the husband annulled the part of her vow concerning the figs, however she is still bound by the vow not to eat the grapes until her husband invalidates that part of her vow also. If she said: 'I swear not to eat these grapes, and I swear not to eat these figs,' she has made two separate vows.'" The Talmud explains that this Mishnah must be understood according to the view of Rabbi Yishmael who holds that the words אישה יקימנו ואישה יפרנו, "her husband may confirm it, or her husband may annul it," refer to the example cited in our Mishnah, that as long her husband has confirmed part of her vow he is considered as having confirmed the whole of it and his wife is bound to observe both parts of her vow. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, interprets the word יקימנו, to mean that the letters מנו in the word יקימנו (30,14) are to be understood as ממנו, "part of it.' He argues that just as her husband may confirm any part of her vow, so he may also annul any part of her vow so that partial confirmation equals total confirmation, so he only needs to annul part of her vow to invalidate all of it. Rabbi Yishmael counters that the Torah, after all, did not write ממנו, "a part of it?" Rabbi Akiva makes a conceptual comparison (מקיש) between invalidating a vow and confirming it. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees claiming that this is both Rabbi Yishmael's and Rabbi Akiva's approach, but that the other sages make the conceptual comparison between 1) confirming of a vow and 2) invalidating it. Just as in the case of invalidating a vow only the part of the vow which he has invalidated is affected, so when he has confirmed it only the part which he has actually confirmed is binding on his wife. The above is the version of our Talmud. Tossaphot, Ran and Nachmanides have a different version in which the conceptual comparison is reversed as follows: "Just as a partial annulment is not valid, so a partial confirmation is not valid ...

ושמע אביה, “and her father has heard about it (the vow).” The Torah speaks only about when the father has heard about his daughter’s vow from her directly. What is the legal status if he heard about her vow only from others? This is why the Torah continues that “all her vows remain in force.” Even if he heard about it only indirectly, he can use his authority to annul it.

But if her father annuls her on the day he hears — all her vows and her bindings with which she has bound herself shall not stand; and it shall be forgiven her before Hashem, because her father annulled her.

ואם הניא אביה אתה BUT IF HER FATHER DISALLOWED HER — The Hebrew signifies, “if he withholds her” from the vow, that is to say, that he annuls it for her. I would not know what this expression הניא, “withholding”, implies (i.e., how he withholds her) — but when it states, (v. 9) “But if on the day that he hears, he withholds her and annuls [her vows]”, one must admit that “the withholding” consists in “annulling the vow” (i.e. in exclaiming מופר לך) (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:6). But still the plain meaning is that it is a term for “withholding” and “removing” (and the word והפר only shows how and by what means she is to be withheld from keeping her vow); and similar is (Numbers 32:7): “And wherefore do you remove (תניאון) [the heart of the children of Israel from the idea of passing over the land]”; and so, too, (Psalms 141:5): “Oil so choice, let not my head turn away (יניא), and similar, also, (Numbers 14:34): “And ye shall know My turning aside (תנואתי)” — i.e. ye shall know that ye have turned aside from Me. וה' יסלח לה AND THE LORD SHALL FORGIVE HER — Of what is Scripture here speaking? Of a woman who, e.g., vowed that she would become a Nazarite, and whose father heard it and annulled it for her, but she knew it not, and transgressed her vow and drank wine or made herself unclean by means of a corpse. It is such a woman who requires forgiveness even though it (her vow) has been annulled. — And if those whose vows have been annulled require forgiveness in such a case, how much more is this so for those whose vows have not been annulled and have been transgressed! (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:6; cf. Kiddushin 81b).

"He restrains [הֵנִיא]" — like [the words meaning] "breaks" and "annuls," as [in the phrase] "my restraint [תְּנוּאָתִי]." "On the day he hears" — not on another day.

וה' יסלח לה, for having made a vow which it was not in her power to fulfill כי הניא אביה אותה, and at the time she made the vow she had not known that her father would object to it. It had been her intention to honour her vow.

וה' יסלח לה כי הניא אביה אותה, “and Hashem will forgive her for her father had restrained her.” The message of this verse is that G’d will forgive her only any violation committed after her father had restrained her. If the girl in question had pre-empted her father’s objection and violated her vow already, she will not be forgiven. The reason is that the father’s authority does not extend to revoking a vow retroactively, that is a privilege the Torah gave only to judges.

And if she should indeed become married to a man, and her vows are upon her, or the utterance of her lips with which she has bound herself —

ואם היו תהיה לאיש AND IF SHE BECOMES A MAN’S — (a phrase used for marriage). This refers to a woman who becomes betrothed (ארוסה). Or perhaps this is not so, but it refers to a married woman (one who has joined her husband; cf. Rashi on Leviticus 21:9). When, however, it says, (v. 11) “And if she vowed in her husband’s house”, it is evident that a married woman is being spoken of there, and here, therefore, the text is speaking of one who has been only betrothed. And it (the separate mention of her) is intended to make a different rule about her — that her father and her husband must annul her vow: if the father annulled and the husband did not annul, or the husband annulled and the father did not annul, then this vow is not regarded as annulled, and it is not necessary to state (and it is a matter of course) that if one of them confirmed the vow the other has no power to annul it (Sifrei Bamidbar 153:7; Nedarim 67a). ונדריה עליה [AND IF SHE BECOMES A MAN’S] AND HER VOWS ARE UPON HER — It means that she had made the vows being in her father’s house, and her father did not hear them, and so they were neither annulled nor confirmed at the time of her betrothal (cf. Sifrei Bamidbar 153:7).

AND IF SHE WERE AT ALL [BETROTHED] TO A MAN, AND THERE ARE VOWS UPON HER. In the opinion of our Rabbis Scripture [here] is saying: “and if she, this woman [mentioned above in Verses 4-6] were at all [betrothed] to a man, and bound herself by a bond, being in her father’s house, in her youth — and there are vows upon her, meaning that her father had not heard them, so that they were neither annulled nor confirmed, and her [betrothed] husband hears them as well [as her father who hears them now when she is betrothed], then he makes void her vow, signifying that he also joins [now] with the father in annulling her vows [that are upon her].” And the phrase she were at all ‘to a man’ means that she is [promised] unto him but [still] is in her father’s house, and has not yet come to his [the man’s] house, and [hence] this must refer to a betrothed girl, for Scripture calls her too, the wife of his fellow. Now our Rabbis did not explain [that this verse refers to a fully-married wife, and teaches] that a husband himself can annul the vows of his married wife which she “brought along” from her father’s house to his house, as would seem the simple meaning of the verse, for if that were so, why would Scripture have to repeat itself and say [in Verse 11], And if a woman vowed in her husband’s house, for if he can annul [even] those vows which preceded [his marriage to her], surely [he can annul] those vows which [she makes whilst she is] in his house! And [even without resorting to this reasoning], it is the tradition [of the Rabbis] which decides [the true meaning of the verses].

"And her vows are upon her" — [this speaks of] while she is in her father's house, and her father did not restrain her; [only then does] her husband restrain her.

או מבטא שפתיה, “or the utterance of her lips;” this does not refer to a casual few words, but is an alternate formula describing an oath, as we know from Leviticus 5,4: כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים, “or if one swears clearly with his lips etc.”

and her husband hears on the day he hears and keeps silent toward her — then her vows shall stand, and her bindings with which she has bound herself shall stand.

ושמע אישה וגו׳ BUT IF HER HUSBAND HEARD etc. — Here you have the case that if the husband confirmed the vow, it is confirmed. (That the father may confirm the vows of his betrothed daughter is given in v. 5 which statement applies also to w. 6 ff. — see Note).

ושמע אישה, “and her husband hears about it;” here Rashi comments that the Torah implies that her husband had silently approved of his wife’s vow that it remains valid. [Our author appears to have had a different version of Rashi’s commentary from that which appears in our editions. Ed.]

ושמע אישה...והחריש לה, “and her husband hears of it (her vow) and remains silent concerning it;” the word אישה in this verse means הארוס שלה, her husband-to-be, fiance who gave her קידושין.

But if on the day her husband hears he annuls her and nullifies her vow that is upon her, and the utterance of her lips with which she has bound herself — it shall be forgiven her before Hashem.

והפר את נדרה AND HE (THE HUSBAND) ANNULS HER VOW — One might think that since confirmation by the husband does not require the assent of the father, in the case mentioned here it is annulled even if the father has not annulled it! It, however, states, (v. 17): "[These are the laws … relating to a father with his daughter] בנעריה בית אביה" which means: so long as she is בנעריה (not fully married) she is under her father’s control (Sifrei Bamidbar 155; Ketuvot 46b).

"On the day of hearing" — the matter from her mouth. "The utterance of her lips" — the oath.

ואם ביום שמוע אישה אותה ...וה' יסלח לה, “and if on the day her husband hears about it ..he revokes it, etc.” the verse speaks about a situation when the father of the girl has already made use of his right to annul her vow. Under such circumstances her husband has the right to complete the annulment commenced in part by her father. This is why the Torah first wrote the additional words בנעוריה בית אביה, “while she was not of age and in her father’s house.” If the (wife) in question had made vows (in her father’s house while he was alive) prior to her becoming betrothed to her husband, her husband cannot revoke them. This is the meaning of Nedarim 72 that the husband cannot revoke vows made by his wife before she became betrothed to him, seeing that the principle that she automatically presumes her husband’s consent to such a vow would not have applied while she did not even know who her husband was going to be. This assumption that vows are made on the understanding that both father and husband do not object is the only reason why a vow, i.e. an undertaking of Biblical force can be revoked by a husband invoking only rabbinical force. The example we have in mind is a twelve-year old who is fatherless but mature enough to understand the meaning of her vows who has been given in marriage to her husband by her mother. The situation of a widowed woman we mentioned as category 4 above refers only to a woman who became a widow after having been fully married (חופה), i.e. after having lived with her husband. Her status, as well as that of a divorcee, is that she had no longer been under the authority of her father at all. Seeing that the authority of her father had ceased completely after she had received חופה, the final stage of becoming married, her father will not again have any authority over her regardless of her age. This also proves that the institution of חופה is Biblical in its legal force, and that once there had been חופה, if her husband is a priest he must defile himself at her burial, is entitled to inherit her, and is exclusively entitled to revoke her vows [inasmuch as they affect him. Ed.]

But a vow of a widow or of a divorced woman — whatever she has bound upon herself shall stand upon her.

כל אשר אסרה על נפשה יקום עליה [BUT THE VOW OF A WIDOW AND OF ONE WHO IS DIVORCED] EVERYTHING WHEREWITH SHE HATH BOUND HER SOUL SHALL STAND AGAINST HER — because she is not under the control of a father or under the control of a husband. Scripture is speaking of one who is a widow after having been fully married (נשואה) (Sifrei Bamidbar 154:1), but in the case of one who becomes a widow after having only been betrothed, if her husband dies his entire authority becomes emptied (void) and returns to her father (Nedarim 70a).

And if she vowed in her husband's house, or bound herself with a binding upon herself with a sworn oath —

ואם בית אישה נדרה AND IF SHE VOWED IN HER HUSBAND’S HOUSE — Here Scripture is speaking of a woman who is fully married (Sifrei Bamidbar 154:1; Nedarim 67a).

"And if in her husband's house she vowed" — [this refers to] the widow in earlier times: if her husband restrained her, she may not fulfill her vow during her widowhood. This concerns a future matter — she had made the vow, and the husband died before the time [for fulfilling it] arrived. The word "forgiveness" [סְלִיחָה] has already been explained.

ואם בית אשה נדרה, this is in contrast to the scenario described earlier in verse 7, where vows made before the woman became married or betrothed are discussed. Seeing that these verses are sequential it is clear that the husband has the right to countermand vows made before the woman’s marriage if they interfere with his quality of life.

But if, while she was in her husband's house, or while she had not attained to marriage years, she had vowed, or bound her soul with the bond of an oath.

and her husband heard and kept silent toward her, he did not annul her — then all her vows shall stand, and every binding with which she has bound herself shall stand.

which her husband had heard of, and had neither spoken nor prohibited her, or had died before she was married, then all her vows shall be confirmed, and all the obligations with which she had bound her soul be ratified, and her father shall have no power to absolve her.

But if her husband utterly nullifies them on the day he hears — all the utterance of her lips concerning her vows and concerning her self-imposed binding shall not stand; her husband has nullified them, and it shall be forgiven her before Hashem.

ואם הפר יפר אותם אישה, "But if her husband will surely declare her vow null and void, etc." In order to understand why the Torah repeated the word הפר and why the Torah wrote the words כל מוצא שפתיה, "everything which her lips uttered," can be understood with the help of Nedarim 82. We are told there in the name of Shemuel that "if she vowed not to eat two loaves of bread, and observing her vow concerning one of these loaves represents hardship for her, [i.e. it looks very appetizing Ed.] whereas abstaining from the other loaf does not represent any hardship for her, then, if the husband cancels the loaf which represents hardship, he automatically is also considered as having cancelled the vow not to eat the other loaf." It is such a situation which our verse envisaged when referring to two הפרות, cancellations, or breaching of the vow. Once the husband has cancelled the part of her vow which is subject to his prerogative to cancel, he has also cancelled the part which is not subject to his authority to cancel. [one must appreciate here that the husband's entire authority stems from the fact that if his wife suffers emotionally as a result of her vow, this disturbs the harmonious relationship between him and his wife. Ed.] The Torah goes on with כל מוצא שפתיה לא יקום, that none of her utterances are valid. This means that even if her husband disallowed those parts of her vow over which he has no legal authority, they become ineffective because he has already disallowed the parts over which he does have legal authority. According to the approach of Rav Assi who disagreed with this interpretation in Nedarim, claiming that the prerogative of the woman's husband extends only to the part of the vow which is burdensome for her and therefore potentially also for him, we would have to explain the words in this verse as follows: אם הפר, "if the husband disallows something which he is entitled to disallow," יפר, "his objection is legally valid;" it is not valid, however, concerning parts of his wife's vow which does not have the potential to bother him and which therefore is excluded from this whole legislation. The reason the Torah had to write both the word כל and the word נדריה was to inform us that even if the vow is made up of two parts only one of which is burdensome for the wife, the parts of the vow are lumped together for the purpose of disallowing it. Our verse becomes clearer when we consider what the Mishnah says in Nedarim 87 [The subject is a husband or father who has failed to dissolve his wife's or his daughter's vow within the prescribed period of time because he was unaware of part of the legislation and who now explains his dilemma to a collegium of judges. Ed.] When someone says: "I am aware that there are regulations regarding the keeping of vows, but I was unaware of my right to disallow some such vows;" he is allowed to disallow the vow in question at the later date when he was told the regulations. Alternatively, this petitioner ...

Every vow and every sworn binding to afflict oneself — her husband may uphold them or her husband may nullify them.

כל נדר וכל שבעת אסר וגו׳ EVERY VOW AND EVERY BINDING OATH [TO AFFLICT THE SOUL HER HUSBAND MAY CONFIRM IT OR HER HUSBAND MAY ANNUL IT] — Because it states that a husband may annul his wife’s vows, one might think that all vows are implied! It therefore states: “[every vow] …to afflict the soul” — he may annul only vows to afflict the soul, and these are set forth in Treatise Nedarim 79b.

EVERY VOW, AND EVERY BINDING OATH TO AFFLICT THE SOUL, [HER HUSBAND MAY ESTABLISH IT, AND HER HUSBAND MAY MAKE IT VOID]. “Since He had said [in the preceding verses] that a husband may annul [his wife’s vows], I might think that this includes all her vows! Scripture therefore says, to afflict the soul, meaning that he can only annul vows which afflict the soul, and they are explained in Tractate Nedarim.” These are the words of Rashi. But his language here is [too] concise, because a husband annuls vows which afflict the soul, such as [if she vows] “The fruits of the world be forbidden to me,” or even if she [only] vowed that she would not taste one of all the kinds [of fruits]; and likewise he may annul matters [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, even if they do not involve affliction of the soul, such as [if she swore] “I will not paint [my eyes]” or “I will not put powder on my face,” or “I will not have sexual intercourse,” these being matters about which He said, between a man and his wife, as is explained in the last chapter of Tractate Nedarim. Such is also the law with respect to the father himself, as we have been taught in the Sifre: “I only know that a husband may annul vows [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, and vows which afflict the soul, [to the exclusion of other vows which he may not annul]. Whence do I know that the father [is similarly limited in his rights]? You can reason [in the following manner] etc… But I have not succeeded in establishing [the father’s law] by reason. Therefore Scripture says: These are the statutes, which the Eternal commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter. [This teaches us that] we must of necessity compare the father to the husband, sothat just as the husband may only annul vows [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, and matters which involve affliction of the soul, so also the father may only annul matters [which concern the laws] between him and her, and matters which involve affliction of the soul.” It is also taught in this way in the Gemara Yerushalmi of Tractate Nedarim.

"To afflict the soul" — even [a vow] to afflict the soul, which is fasting, as I have explained.

כל נדר וכל שבועת אסר לענות נפש, “any vow or oath which results in a personal affliction, etc.” Here the Torah teaches that the fact that the Torah has granted the husband of a woman the right to interfere with her vows and to annul them is not a carte blanche applicable to any type of vow. The husband’s authority applies only when such a vow results in personal pain or discomfort also involving him in his marital status. If his wife were to vow not to wash or bathe herself, keeping such a vow would clearly interfere with their marital life; as a result of such considerations the Torah permitted her husband a veto power over such vows. It goes without saying that the husband can veto any vow of his wife which would interfere directly with their family life together. The husband’s authority extends to his wife’s vowing not to use eye-shadow or even certain products for sale in specific stores. We derive all this from the words בין איש לאשתו “between man and his wife,” in verse 17. The reason the husband has the right to interfere in vows concerning either ענוי נפש, self-affliction, and matters directly involving inter-marital relations is that his wife (any wife) is subservient to her husband in two areas; he is entitled to demand that his wife appear attractive to him and not take measures which result in her becoming physically repugnant to her husband. Our sages in Ketuvot 62 understood this concept as derived form Genesis 3,20 “for she (Chavah) is the mother of all living beings,” as meaning that the wife’s purpose in life is to enhance the quality of life of her husband not the reverse. In matters of their sexual relations there is no need for additional proof that the wife is subservient to the needs of her husband as denial by the wife of the husband’s legitimate rights whether with a vow or without a vow means that she endangers her marriage and would forfeit her כתובה upon being divorced for cause. In matters which have no bearing on the successful relations between husband and wife the husband has no authority to interfere with his wife’s vows.

כל נדר וכל שבועת איסר לענות נפש, “any vow or any prohibition by oath, the purpose of which is to diminish one’s quality of life, etc.” This verse tells us that the husband has no power to rescind a vow by his wife unless it impinges on his quality of life; for instance, if his wife vowed not to partake of certain foodstuffs forever, and the change in her diet has definitively negative effect on her health, something that it is in her husband’s interest to preserve. The same applies to matters that affect the interpersonal relationship between husband and wife, such as the wife vowing not to use any cosmetics, something that will make her unattractive in the eyes of her husband. Anything that is within the province of a husband to rescind is also within the province of a father to rescind. The Torah equated father and husband by writing בין איש לאשתו ובין אב לבתו, “between a man and his wife or between a father and his daughter.”

But if her husband keeps completely silent toward her from day to day and upholds all her vows or all her bindings that are upon her — he has upheld them, because he kept silent toward her on the day he heard.

מיום אל יום [BUT IF HER HUSBAND ALTOGETHER HOLD HIS PEACE AT HER] FROM DAY TO DAY — In order that you should not say that ביום שמעו in v. 13 means that the husband has the right of annulling from the time on the day when she made the vow to the same time on the next day (i.e., twenty-four hours), it accordingly states מיום אל יום, i.e., from the day when she makes the vow up to the next day, — to tell you that he may annul the vow only up to when it becomes dark, [for then another day begins] (cf. Nedarim 76b).

"And he upholds" — he had already upheld [her vows]; and then [Scripture] explains how he upheld them — by keeping silent on the day he heard.

ואם החרש יחריש, when someone who has the authority to cancel a vow keeps silent when he hears it, it is as if he had given his consent by not voicing his objection.

מיום אל יום, “from one day to the next.” This verse makes it clear that revoking a vow must occur during the same day, the day being considered the same period as during the six days of creation. The day commences with nightfall and extends for 24 hours until the next evening. It is not a period of 24 hours commencing at the moment when the husband hears about his wife’s vow. If the woman made a vow in the morning of any day the husband upon hearing of it has only till nightfall of the same day to oppose and revoke it. This is the reason the sages permitted the husband to revoke vows made by his wife on the Sabbath if these vows were not directly related to the Sabbath (Nedarim 77). This, in spite of the fact that revoking a vow is similar to pronouncing judgment, something that is forbidden on the Sabbath. If the husband were not allowed to revoke such vows his wife could always make vows on the Sabbath and thus undermine her husband’s authority to cancel her vows. This relaxation of the rules of the Sabbath applies only to a husband revoking the vow of is wife. If she needs the services of a judge, expert or quorum of three laymen to release her from a foolish vow, she will have to wait until after the Sabbath as outsiders who are not affected by her vows are not given leeway to use their authority in releasing someone from a vow on the Sabbath. If the woman’s vow involved matters pertaining to the Sabbath on which she made the vow, the expert has the right to use his authority to release her from such a vow even on the Sabbath. An example of such a vow would be one which would have prevented her from eating on the Sabbath in question. The time frame we discussed applies both to the father and to the husband as the case may be, starting from the time they heard of the vow in question. If a husband or father canceled the woman’s vow later than the time the Torah permitted and the wife or daughter ignores her vow relying on her father or husband having revoked it, he is held liable for violating her vow. This is why the Torah writes here: ”if he will revoke them (the vows) after his having heard” (in contrast with verse 13 where the wording is “on the day he hears about it”), he will bear her iniquity.” This verse gives rise to a general rule in halachah: “he who through his actions causes his fellow to become guilty of a trespass will personally bear the penalties which result for his fellow from his action” (Sifri Mattot 156, quoted by Rashi). Nachmaides, in justifying this ruling, writes that the woman in question is considered as either having sinned unwittingly or as having been deceived altogether and not having sinned at all by violating her vow. The verse we quoted is understood by Nachmanides as applying to a husband who, when he heard of the vow did not object, and when he eventually voiced his objection claimed that it was within the time frame permitted by the Torah Accordingly, the verse teaches a) the husband bears the guilt and penalty as if he had made the vow and violated it. b) she is free from all guilt pertaining to her vow. If his wife was aware of the fact that her husband did not revoke her vow in time, seeing she knew the law, she is held liable for acting on the basis of such an objection. Her husband, while not liable for her vow, is nonetheless liable for having caused such a guilt to come into existence. He had squandered an opportunity to protest his wife’s vow in time and had neglected to do so, thus becoming indirectly responsible for her violating her vow. Although the Torah writes this legislation using the husband as the example and therefore guilty party (although the same legislation applies to her father as long as he has the authority over her), it may be that in most such situations the father, out of his love for his daughter, would immediately voice his objection thus protecting his daughter against becoming guilty of profaning her vow. A husband who may be angry at his wife for making such a vow in the first place, may be less considerate in protecting his wife against trespassing, wanting her to become guilty of a guilt-offering. (Thus far Nachmanides).

But if he utterly nullifies them after he has heard — he shall bear her guilt.

אחרי שמעו [BUT IF HE SHALL AT ALL ANNUL THEM] AFTER HE HATH HEARD THEM i.e., after he has heard and confirmed them — that he had said, “I am content with it”, then if he turns and annuls it even on the same day (Sifrei Bamidbar 156:2). ונשא את עונה HE SHALL BEAR HER INIQUITY — He takes her place. We learn from here that he who makes another take a false step takes his place in respect to all punishments which he would incur (Sifrei Bamidbar 156:2).

[BUT IF HE SHALL MAKE THEM NULL AFTER THAT HE HATH HEARD THEM], THEN HE SHALL BEAR HER INIQUITY — “he [the husband] takes her place. Thus we learn that one who causes somebody else to commit an offense takes the place of that person with respect to all punishments [which that person would otherwise incur].” This is Rashi’s language, taken from the Sifre. It would appear that this woman [broke her vow] in error or was misled, for Scripture speaks [here] of a husband who heard [his wife’s vow and did not annul it on that day], and the wife does not know about this, and after some time he “annulled” [the vow, although he in fact no longer had the power to do so], and told her that [he annulled it] in the day he heard it. Thus Scripture teaches us two things: that the husband bears her iniquity as if he had made a vow and profaned his word, and that she is totally free and not liable to any of the punishments [found elsewhere] for errors. But if the wife knows that he [her husband] did not annul it in the day he heard it, and she is versed in this law [that he only has a right to annul her vows on the day that he hears it, and not later, and nonetheless she breaks her vow], then she is the guilty one, and [since] the husband did not cause the offense, therefore his punishment is [only] like that of someone who can protest [at another person committing a sin] and does not protest. Now Scripture mentions this case with reference to a husband [misleading his wife to think that he annulled her vow in the day he heard it, when in actual fact he “annulled” it only afterwards when he no longer had the right to], although the same law applies to a father [and his daughter’s vows], because Scripture speaks of normal circumstances, that a father usually guards himself against doing this because of his love for his daughter, whereas a husband might perhaps hate his wife and think that he will make her guilty [by misleading her to break her vow]. Now Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra wrote: “Then he shall bear her iniquity, because she is under his control.” If so, the verse is speaking of a case where he forces her to do that which she has bound herself [not to do, and it is then that he shall bear her iniquity]. But it is not correct [since the same laws obviously apply when he misleads her without actually forcing her].

"And he shall bear her iniquity" — for she is under his authority.

ואם הפר יפר אותם אחרי שמעו, more than 24 hours after he had heard about it, i.e. when the period during which he could have cancelled it had expired, he can no longer change his mind; ונשא את עונה, the same guilt as that of a person who forces someone else to commit a violation of Torah law, or who teaches Torah other than according to the halachah, thereby misleading the student.

ואם הפר יפר, "and if he surely decides to disallow, etc." This verse means that even when the vows he now decides to disallow are the type which he could have disallowed during the prescribed period, now that he has waited too long, he can no longer exercise his authority but must bear her guilt (if she violates her vow).

ונשא את עונה, “and he will bear the burden of her guilt.” She was as if having acted under compulsion, as she was under the impression that her husband was able to cancel her vow even after he had known about it for more than a day.

ונשא את עונה, ”and he shall bear her iniquity.” If someone, -in this case the husband- causes someone else to commit a sin, the latter person is burdened with that guilt. In this instance, the husband, by rescinding his wife’s vow after the time limit for this privilege had expired, thereby deceived his wife into believing that her vow had been cancelled. If she then violates the terms of her vow, it is the husband who bears the iniquity.

ואם הפר יפר אותם אחרי שמעו, and she does not even know that her husband had become aware of her vow, she must bear the burden of having violated her vow. Although, legally, her husband’s cancellation is effective, since she was not aware of this she had sinned unintentionally by violating her vow seeing she did not know that it was no longer valid.

These are the statutes that Hashem commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter in her youth, in her father's house.

"Between a man and his wife" — [this refers to] her being of full age [a bogeret]. "Between a father and his daughter" — [this refers to] her not yet being of full age; that is why it says "in her youth."

בין איש לאשתו, בין אב לבתו, “between man and his wife, between father and his daughter.” Our sages in Sifri Mattot 156 drew a comparison between husband and father. Just as the husband is only permitted to revoke those vows of his wife which either directly affect their marital relations or which represent an affliction upon his wife threatening to make her repulsive to her husband’s eyes, so the father also may only cancel vows of his daughter if they are either an affliction for his daughter undermining her health, or otherwise disturb the normal relationship between father and daughter. If, for instance, the daughter had vowed not to provide the services for her father which a daughter is expected to perform for him, the father is entitled to declare such a vow as null and void. This is also spelled out specifically in the Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11,1. Nachmanides, in his volume on the laws of vows, agrees with the Jerusalem Talmud. Maimonides does not base his rulings on vows on the Jerusalem Talmud and rules that the father has an unrestricted right to cancel vows made by his daughter prior to her reaching the age of 12 and a half years. (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 12,1). He follows the plain text of the verse which does not speak of any restrictions. When the scholars from Luneil challenged Maimonides’ ruling pointing to the Sifri we quoted as their source, Maimonides told them that the author of the Sifri unless otherwise noted is Rabbi Shimon, and that we do not generally rule according to his opinion when it conflicts with the opinion of other scholars. Concerning the subject of the efficiency and therefore desirability of making vows altogether, Maimonides writes in Hilchot Nedarim 5,23: “if someone engages in the practice of making vows to help him build his character, resist temptation, etc., then such a practice is praiseworthy. Example: if someone used to indulge in excessive consumption of wine and strong drink and he imposes upon himself a vow to abstain from drinking wine for an extended period in order to help him overcome his desire to imbibe this is a good idea. Similarly, if someone pursued illegal gains, i.e. payment for services not rendered, and the like, and he repents and wants to reinforce his resolution to desist from this in the future, he may make a vow not to accept gratuitous benefits from certain people, or even from all persons. There are other similar situations when the making of a vow is basically desirable. The principal criterion governing the desirability of a vow is if it helps the person making it to better serve his Creator. Pursuing this line of thought, our sages in Avot 3,13 have said נדרים סיג לפרישות, “vows are a fence for abstinence.” Maimonides quotes several verses from the Bible in support of such an attitude, such as Psalms 119,106: “I have firmly sworn to keep Your just rules.” (Clearly, even David had to reinforce his resolutions with an oath). We know that Yaakov made a vow from Genesis 28,20. Our sages in Bereshit Rabbah 70,1 said that the reason that Yaakov added the word לאמור, “to say,” before spelling out the details of his vow was to tell his descendants that when they would find themselves in a situation similar to that of the patriarch Yaakov, they too should resort to making vows. In Numbers 21,2 we find that the Israelites accepted their patriarch Yaakov’s advice and vowed to destroy the Canaanites and their belongings if only the Lord would make them victorious over their attackers, the Canaanites.